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Abstract
Many studies have been conducted to analyze the effect of stricter Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL). However, almost all of them has focused on an ex-post impact; leaving aside
a second but equally important channel: expectations. This paper aims to analyze the role of
expectations on peruvian formal and informal labor market; using news as our identification
variable. We use the monthly number of news related to the approval of the General Labor
Law (GLL), a proposal entailing future stronger labor rigidities, from January 2001 to May
2012. Using the Permanent Employment Survey (EPE), we find a negative relation between
expectations towards a stricter labor market and both employment and average income. News
mainly affect formal occupied EAP, arousing a substitution effect from formal to informal
employment. We also discover that the effect of expectations differs in periods with higher
versus lower GDP growth. Finally, we find some evidence supporting news having a cumulative
effect: the larger the previous stock of news, the weaker the effect.
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1 Introduction
In 2001 arose the idea of establishing a law to protect workers. As of today, the General Labour
Law project has undergone three updates over the years. Between 2002 and 2005 the first delivery
of the draft was discussed in 152 sessions, which concluded in the approval of 72% of the 468
items proposed. In 2006, there was another discussion of the remaining points from the previous
debate. Finally, in 2011, the executive power reactivated the debate by transferring the bill to a
council of experts, in order to achieve consensus. Meanwhile, the Congress Working Committee
also reactivated the original document update project. Despite having these two channels, the
discussion of the General Labour Act is not in agenda of the Congress nor the Executive power.
Although almost 85% of this law’s articles have already been approved, the remaining 15% still
generates some discrepancies between the business association and the union power. These dis-
agreements are centered in three key points that prevent full approval of the law: the elevation of
the compensation for unfair dismissal, the reduction of the types and duration of temporary con-
tracts and the high cost of incorporation as a cause of wrongful dismissal cases referred to the
Constitutional Court.
Currently, compensation for unfair dismissal is regulated in 12 years; while the Executive power
proposes to increase this payment to 16 years and Congress a payment of 24. In the case of tempo-
rary contracts, the maximum term is five and there are nine types of contracts. The General Labor
Law proposes reducing to six types and its duration up to 18 months or two years. The last point
that causes controversy is the possibility of incorporating workers unjustified cases determined by
the Constitutional Court as groundless dismissal, fraudulent and against fundamental rights. In-
corporating involves giving them work and payment of wages earned even though they have not
worked during the dictamination process. In general, all these measures imply a higher cost of
dismissal for the employer, increasing labor market rigidities.
One of the biggest questions raised is the possible impact of the approval and implementation of
this law in labor market. But we have to take into account that its impact is not only ex-post; but
also ex-ante through firm’s expectations. Policy-makers do not usually take in consideration that
firms are also rational agents; and, as such, they react not only after the law is implemented; but
even before if the context can strongly modify their expectations towards a stricter labor market.
Indeed, the ex-ante effect could have been really important in the early years of the last decade;
when the discussion of this law was at its peak.
The effect of this General Labor Law might have an interesting effect in a country like Peru; which
is characterized as an economy with high levels of informality. The latter is usually associated
with having negative impacts on GDP per capita. Main arguments are that it hinders economic
transactions; as well as it reduces reporting agents. This last fact makes that the government faces
a distorted figure when making decisions.
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This negative relation can be seen in Figure 1; where we compare informality rates and GDP per-
capita for almost 100 countries in 2012. It can be observed that a higher level of GDP per-capita is
related with a lower degree of informality. However, Peru’s location shows that it has a high level
of GDP per capita and informality too. This demonstrates that even though the average income
per capita is growing the informality is not being reduced. Also other countries such as Australia
with a higher level of GDP per capita it’s not accompanied with informality; mainly because the
reduction of it droved the economy into better financial and fiscal performance.
As noted below, Peru is one of the countries with more degree of informality in the world; ranking
fifth only below Georgia, Bolivia, Panama and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Peru seems to have a 20
percentage points excess of labor informality in relation to what its GDP per-capita would predict.
The main reason is its very strict labor legislation.
Figure 1: Informality and GDP per-capita, 2012
In this sense, this paper aims to estimate the effect of expectations of General Labor Law Proposal
on the level of both formal and informal employment and average income. This way, we show the
ex-ante effects of this law on the informal sector and, hence, on GDP. We suggest that an increase
in firm’s expectations towards a stricter labor market had a negative impact on these aggregated
variables.
Literature related on Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) has mainly focused on its ex-post
impact; analyzing different indicators after some protective’s law approval. Previous studies for
developed economies has shown that stricter EPL has several effects on both labor and key macroe-
conomic variables. Lawrence Kahn (2007) studied the effect of protective law in labor distribution
using the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) for eight countries of the OECD. He finds
that it favors older, male and native workers rather young immigrant females.
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Also, Bassanini et al (2008) found that stricter EPL leads to lower productivity growth; mainly in
binding industries, defined by the authors as those industries whith high layoff rate. Using this same
definition, Mico and Pages (2006) discovered that a more stringent labor legislation causes lower
employment and turnover ratios in binding industries. On the same line falls the results obtained by
DiTella and MacCulloch (2005), who, using a VAR for labor variables, found that countries with
high labor flexibility have experienced also higher employment rates.
Similar results have been found for developing economies. As Kahn (2007), Heckman and Pages
(2000) and Montenegro and Pages (2003) showed that an increase in firing costs has a strong
effect on employment rates of younger and female workers in Latin America. Also, Lehmann
and Muravyev (2012) obtained that, in Armenia, reducing the stringency of labor regulation in 1%
would reduce informality in 0.04%. Besley and Burges (2004) analyzed the effect of the Industrial
Disputes Act (IDA) on the manufacture’s growth between 1958 and 1992 in India. They found that
this law reduced the level of employment and increased the size of the informal sector; leading to a
lower level of output. Using this same law, Ahsan and Pages (2008) found that the more stringent
EPL had a negative effect on output (stronger in the manufacture sector), employment and wages.
Nevertheless, all these previous studies are based on an ex post analysis. There is little evidence on
what would happen before the law has been approved. In this aspect Marcel Garz (2012) found for
Germany that there exist an asymmetry in the effect of negative news released, which means that a
negative economic coverage of news translates in pessimism unemployment expectations. This is
the closest paper we found to ours; but we will also estimate the second channel of expectations on
employment and income.
To identify firm’s expectations, we use the number of news related to the approval of the General
Labor Law from January of 2001 to May of 2005. The labor variables were taken from the Perma-
nent Employment Survey administrated by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics. This
survey provides quarterly information of approximately 19 200 interviewed households in a year.
Its objective is to track labor information from Lima Metropolitana and the constitutional province
of Callao.
This information allowed us to establish three panels according to the respondent level of education,
age and gender. Our main variables of interest are Occupied EAP and average income; and we
identify formal and informal workers using health insurance affiliation. We used fixed effects to
estimate the impact of news on each panel; as well as other different specifications that allowed us
to identify if expectations have a differential effect in periods with high or low growth; and whether
it has a cumulative effect.
Our main results show that news coverage affects negatively both employment and average income.
However it has a higher effect on formal EAP. This suggests a subtitution effect between formal
and informal workers; leading the former becoming now part of the latter. On the other hand,
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expectations towards a stricter labor market also has a negative impact on average income; specially
in wages for all workers, not just the formal ones. This could make us think that the statistical effect
is due to a possible effect on the informal sector, because it has no restrained costs as the formal
sector does, especially if we consider the formal sector rigidities like contracts.
Also we found that there exists differential effects in periods with higher versus lower growth in
both employment and average income; althoug this effect is not robust to all of our three panels.
Finally, we discovered that news has a decreasing effect, that is, the effect of an additional new
when there is a large stock of news is weaker than if this extra new is a one-time announcement.
A reasonable explanation of this result is that in the former situation this extra new would be one
from the lot, representing no credible additional information regarding a stricter labor market. In
contrast, in the former situation, this additional new entails a first posibility of an important change
in legislation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses what has been done in literature regarding
firing costs and stricter labor markets. Section III describes the Permanent Employment Survey
and the expectations index; as well as the methodology used for estimation. Section IV presents
our results and Section V concludes.
2 Literature Revision
In this section we review the main studies that aims to predict the different effects of increasing
firing costs on, on one hand, macroeconomic key variables such as GDP, added value, productivity,
formal employment and informality; and, on the other, some firm-level variables such as wages,
job turnover, vacancies or even number of plants per firm. The consequences of firing costs are not
yet known with certainty, as we can find evidence both in favor and against it; although almost all
studies finds a negative effect on job turnover.
For the case of developed countries, Kahn (2007) analyzed the effect of a stricter Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) on permanent employment among different demographic groups. He
distinguished between gender, age, cognitive ability and native versus immigrant citizens. For
that, he used the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) from 1994 to 1998 for some OECD
countries, in particular: Canada, Finland, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United
States; taking advantage of their very different labor regulation history. Kahn used a logit model,
where the dependent variable took the value of one if the worker in time t had a permanent job; as
well as fixed effects for industry, occupation and country. His main results established that stringent
EPL favors older, male and native workers with a rather high cognitive ability.
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On other side, Bassanini et al. (2008) analyzed the effect of raising firing costs on productivity,
distinguishing between EPL-binding industries, where EPL have a large importance since its in-
herent layoff rate is relatively high; from EPL-non-binding industries. They used the EPL indexes
elaborated by the OECD; and data was taken from various sources such as the World Bank, EUK-
LEMS, OECD, among others. The approach used was difference-in-difference (DID); to analyze
the incremental effect of EPL on binding versus non-binding industries.Bassanini et al. also found
a negative effect of EPL since stringent labor regulation leads to lower productivity growth in
EPL-binding industries. A similar approach was taken by Micco & Pages (2006), analyzing the
differential effect of EPL on industries with a more volatile layoff rate relative to industries with
stable layoff rates. The results were very similar to those obtained byBassanini et al. (2008), as
stringent EPL leads to lower employment and turnover ratios in industries where the layoff rate has
high volatility.
Di Tella & MacCulloch (2005) took one step ahead and estimated a VAR model to study the ef-
fect of labor market flexibility on employment. Their dependent variables were employment rate,
labor participation rate, average worked hours in the manufacture sector and the unemployment
rate. They worked with 21 OECD countries on a seven year period, from 1984 to 1990; using the
OECD unemployment insurance system as a proxy of a country wellbeing and the World Compet-
itiveness Report (WCR) to obtain a variable for labor market flexibility. The main results showed
that economies with more flexible labor markets have higher employment rates.
Cross country studies have also been done in emerging economies. Indeed, Heckman & Pages
(2000) analyzed the effect of labor protection legislation on the level and distribution of employ-
ment in Latin America. The authors used OECD methodology for the construction of the same
key variables in 15 Latin American countries; working both together and separately with 28 OECD
countries. Additionally, they built an index to measure firing costs in each country based on sev-
erance payment. Heckman & Pages utilized the OLS, fixed effect and random effects estimators;
obtaining a strong negative effect of firing costs on employment rates, and that this affects more
intensively to younger and female workers, in line with previous results.
For the interest of this paper, there has also been some research of the effect of firing cost on
informality. As we have seen, there is a significant amount of studies that states that higher firing
costs (in the terms of stringent EPL) leads to lower job turnover and even a decrease in the level of
employment. The question here is: does it mean that all the employers dismissed unemployed?
Lehmann & Muravyev (2012) tried to pose a solution to this issue by analyzing the impact of the
labor market institutions (including labor regulation) on informality. They used the “Labor Markets
in emerging and transition economies” database elaborated by IZA, which provides information of
the labor market1 for 27 countries from center Europe and Asia in a four year interval from 1995
1 Such as labor legislation, unemployment insurance, expenditure in labor programs, among others.
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to 2007. Additionally, they collect similar information for 25 Latin American economies from the
World Bank for three years: 1999, 2003 and 2007. The authors used the definition of informality
posed by Schenider and Enste (2000)2 . The methodology applied was panel data with fixed effects
for country and year. They found that economies with more stringent EPL have higher informality
levels: reducing the stringency of labor regulation in 1% would reduce informality in 0.04%.
The outcomes obtained for cross country analysis remain fairly the same when analyzing each
country individually. Autor et al. (2007) estimated the effect of firing costs on employment and
productivity in the United States using the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and the Annual
Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) from 1976 to 1999. They used the wrongful-discharge protection
(WDP) law, approved in 1970 and lasted until 1999. This law had three major regulations: (i) the
employer will terminate the contract only in good faith and fair dealing (good faith exception);
(ii) the employee cannot be fired when fulfilling public labors such as being part of the jury or
denouncing employers bad behavior (public policy exception); and (iii) the employer cannot fire
the employee for an unjustified reason (“implied contract” exception). Using fixed effects for
industry and year, the authors found that WDP reduces job turnover and entry and exit rates of
firms; affecting more intensively in capital based industries because of the negative effect of WDP
on capital productivity.
Taking advantage of the 1990 reform that took place in Italy, where “unjustified” firing cost were
raised for firms with 15 or less workers, leaving this costs constant for bigger firms; Kugler &
Pica (2008) studied the effect of higher firing costs on job turnover rates and employment. The
authors used the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) for 1986 to 1995, which contains
both employee and firm main characteristics for every worker in the manufacture and services
industry born the 10th of March, June, September and December. Kugler & Pica utilized a lineal
probability model (LPM) where the dependent variable takes the value of one if a match3 is created.
Simultaneously, they used a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to analyze the differential
effect between small and large firms; and used fixed effect by industry, region and year. The main
results are in line with the literature shown here: the 1990 Italian reform had a negative effect on
permanent accessions and separations. Nevertheless, they obtained that the impact on employment
was not statistically significant.
Leonardi & Pica (2010) used this same reform but now to study its effect on wages; and in which
type of worker would have the greater effect. They distinguished between high bargaining power
worker (characterized by the authors as incumbent, white collar and older workers) and low bar-
gaining power workers (movers, blue collar and younger workers). The authors used a difference-
in-difference approach (DID) combined with a regression discontinuity design (RDD) around the
2 Informal economy includes “unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from mon-
etary or barter transactions, hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to the
tax authorities”.
3 That is, if either an accession or a separation takes place.
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threshold of 15 workers per firm; using dummy variables for industry and year to control for fixed
effects. They also used IV estimation to deal with the endogeneity of the firms, as they can choose
their size to avoid the reform. Their instrument variable was size of the firm in 1988 and 1989.
They found that employers in small firms have wages between 0.7% and 1.5% less than employers
in large firms. This effect is mainly due to decrease in wages of low bargaining power workers; as
they obtained that high bargaining power workers suffer no reduction in their salaries.
For developing economies, some research has been done in India. Besley & Burges (2004) analyzed
the effect of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) on the manufacture’s growth between 1958 and
1992. This law focused on employee protection; including some regulation for the conciliation,
arbitration and adjudication process in case of a conflict. So, the authors classified the laws as pro-
employees (+1), neutral (0) and pro-employer (-1). They used both formal (affected from IDA) and
informal firms, whose information was obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and
the National Sample Surveys (NSS), respectively. A pooled regression panel data model approach
was applied; as well as IV estimation to correct for the endogenenity that workers may be lobbying
so that they could perceive some benefits from labor regulation could. The main results were that
this law had a negative effect on the manufacture industry; both in output and employment. Indeed,
the states with more pro-worker laws have lower employment level. Additionally, they also found
that the IDA increased the size of the informal sector in India.
Using the same law, Ahsan & Pages (2009) studied its effects on output, employment and wages;
and if these effects were the same among industries. They used state and industry-state levels from
1959 to 1997; collecting the information from Besley and Burges database, the Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI) and the Labor Bureau. The authors classified the laws in pro-employee, neutral
and pro-employer, the same way as Besley & Burges. Nevertheless, Ahsan & Pages used fixed
effects at the industry, state and year level. Their results were very similar, showing that the more
stringent EPL had a negative effect on output (stronger in the manufacture sector), employment and
wages; and this effect was more intense in labor based industries.
A similar study was made in Latin America, where Montenegro & Pages (2004), taking advantage
of the high volatility in Chile’s labor regulation to analyze its effect on employment level and
distribution among different demographic groups: by gender, by age and by cognitive level. The
authors used the household survey from 1960 to 1998, elaborated from the economics department
of the “Universidad de Chile”; considering only workers between 15 and 65 years old. They also
worked with some macroeconomic and fiscal variables obtained from Chile’s government and the
World Bank. To compare the expected firing cost, they used the job security measure (JS) developed
in Montenegro and Pages (1999)4. They worked with a probit model with fixed effects; where the
4 This measure is: JSt =∑ni=1 bidi−1(1−d)
(
bi+1 +atSP
jc
t+i+(1−at)SPMct+i
)
; where T is the maximum tenure a worker
can attain in a firm, bi+1 is the advance notice to a worker that has been i years with a firm, at is the probability that
the economic difficulties of the firm are considered a justified cause of dismissal, SP jct+1 is the mandated severance
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dependent variable takes the value of one if the individual is working in year t. As previous studies
showed, they obtained that stricter EPL biased the distribution of employment against the younger,
female and the low cognitive ability workers. In coherence with this, Montenegro and Pages also
found that the employment rate for older, male and the high cognitive ability workers was higher
the more stringent EPL.
Until now, all of this studies are based on an ex post analysis. They are all trying to obtain the
effect of stricter labor regulations on some key variables after the law has already taken place in
the economy. There is little research on what would be the effects of such a law before it has been
approved; so this paper is intended to fulfill this research gap. In this context, perceptions and
expectations become now very important variables.
Although still an ex post analysis, Pierre & Scarpetta (2004), using the World Banking Doing
Business (WDB), World Bank Environment Survey (WBES) and the International Climate Survey
(ICS) from the World Bank; tried to study the impact of the way employers perceive regulations in
each country and its effect on how they react to it. They created their own EPL indexes, both for
permanent and temporal workers. To measure employer’s perception, they used a question from the
WBES database5. First, with a multinomial logit using as the dependent variable the answer of the
perception question, they found that medium size and innovating firms are the most affected from
the EPL. To analyze the employer’s reaction to this perception, the authors developed a bivariate
probit with two dummy variables: whether the firm has used temporal employment (take the value
of one if it has) or whether the firm has provided training to its previous employees to avoid hiring
(again, it is one if it has). They obtained that the worse is the perception of the employers, the
highest the probability of using both alternatives; but the use of training is more likely in large and
medium size firms, while small firms has a higher probability to use temporal employment.
It is imperative to notice that, as expectations and perceptions are more important, the news about
the approval of the stricter (or less strict) law would play a central role. Its importance has already
been evaluated in the literature of other fields such as the effectiveness of public spending in United
States. Valery Ramey (2009), constructed government spending news variables from 1939 to 2008
to analyze the effect of government expenditure on consumption and real wages. She worked
mainly with military expenditure and showed that the timing of news (and therefore, expectations
of agents) really matters when analyzing the effect on other macroeconomic variables.
In the labor market field, Garz (2012) analyzed the potential link between economic news cover-
age and the pessimism in German unemployment expectations; working with monthly series from
2001 to 2009. Taking advantage of an extraordinary collection of news in charge of the Media
payment in such event to a worker that has been i years at the firm, and finally, SPMct+1 denote the payment to be
awarded to a worker with tenure i in case of unjustified dismissal.
5 The question was: “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are these different regulatory areas for the
operation and growth of your business (Please do not select more than 4 obstacles as the“major”)”.
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Tenor International, he examined not only the media coverage effect on the short or long-run; but
also the existence of asymmetry in the effects of negative and positive news, which entails a plausi-
ble relationship between pessimism in unemployment expectations and media coverage. Garz the
quantitative dominance of negative over positive coverage; so he suggested a quantity-related asym-
metry. The unemployment expectations series uses representative data from the European Business
and Consumer Surveys, which repeatedly asks about participant’s unemployment expectations for
the economy in the next 12 months.
He distinguished two main approaches, short and long run analysis. For the first one he estimated
an autorregresive distributed lag model (ARDL) in first differences; while for the second type of
analysis he worked with nonlinear autorregresive distributed lag model (NARDL) because of the
presence of both I(0) and I(1) series6. Working with this framework, he found that, controlling
for quantitative dominance of negative news coverage, there exist an asymmetry in the effect of
negative news regarding the general economic situation, which supports the idea that negativity in
economic news coverage is associated with pessimism in unemployment expectations, disentan-
gling the long-run link between these two variables.
The evidence found here is encouraging towards the importance of ex ante analysis to study the
effect of stringent EPL on both economies and firms. Nevertheless, paper developed by Garz (2012)
represents only the first step in our analysis since it only takes into account the impact of news on
expectations. The second step represents estimating both the direct and indirect effects of news
on other key macroeconomic variables; considering the expectations channel). As we have seen,
Pierre & Scarpetta (2004) worked in this line by estimating labor legislation effects on perceptions
and how would the employers and firms react to them. So, the present paper aims to estimate both
steps, using the “General Labor Law” proposal.
3 Data Description and Methodology
The empirical implications can be tested against industry and household-level data on Peru. For
information regarding labor market indicators and according the worker’s characteristis we use
Permanent Employment Survey (EPE). We also use Peruvian’s newspaper “Gestion” to construct
the expectations index by accounting for the number of news related to the General Labor Law in
each month since 2001 until the last months in 2012.
6 So he could not work with cointegration.
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3.1 Expectations index
In order to analyze the role that plays labor legislation on the evolution of formal employment, we
built an expectations index, which pretends to capture the expectations, mainly of firms, of the leg-
islative change in favour of the General Labor Law. This index was constructed taking into account
the number of news referred to this legislative change in the local newspaper “Gestión” from Jan-
uary of 2001 to May of 2012. The news were prompted by various members of the Work and Social
Security committee, members of the Labor Ministry, member of the National Labor Council, spe-
cialists of the International Labor Organization (ILO), members of the “Confederación Nacional de
Instituciones Empresariales Privadas” (CONFIEP) and the Lima Chamber of Commerce (CCL).
We only use news that appeared on “Gestion” because this is the main economic and business
newspaper in Lima. It also belongs to the economic corporation “El Comercio” and has a tra-
jectory of 22 years. According to the XI Annual Executives Survey drawn by Lima Chamber of
Commerce in November 2011, this is the second most read newspaper by businessman, only behind
“El Comercio” newspaper.
As mentioned earlier, the General Labor Law project was first proposed around the last quarter of
2001. In this year, the discussion about the potential benefits and damages of this law emerged.
On one hand, it was argued that this law could prevent the employees from unjustified layoffs;
but detractors attacked the law claiming that a rise in firing costs could disencourage hiring native
workers; and could even affect firm’s investments. The law’s approval was the centre of debate for
almost six years, mainly between 2002 and 2007. After this period, the relevance of this law started
to fall slowly, until there were almost no news related to the topic from the second half of 2008.
It was not until 2011 that the law gain relevance; as the proposal was renewed. The evolution of
this topic can be captured in our expectations index; which collects monthly news related to the
General Labor Law project from the most important business newspaper in Peru (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Expectations Index, 2001 - 2012
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3.2 Permanent Employment Survey (EPE)
The Permanent Employment Survey (from now on, EPE, from its acronym in spanish) provides
quarterly information for labor indicators since March 2001. This survey is administrated by the
“Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática” (INEI), and covers 19 200 households approx-
imately annually, quarterly covering around 4 500 households. Although the frequency of this
survey is monthly, the variables are presented for the last moving quarter. The scope of the survey
is only for Lima Metropolitana and the Constitutional Province of Callao, accounting both, urban
and rural areas from 43 districts in the province of Lima and 6 districts in the province of Callao.
Although it’s not nationally representative, the information it provides is valuable to track labor
market performance. The survey is carried quarterly, asking around 56 questions about characteris-
tics of household members (12 questions), employment and income (26 questions) and household
income such as occupational wages (18 questions). Respondents are family members, domestic
workers that lives in the household and people who were in the household the last 30 days over 14
years old. This survey offers agreggated indicators such as the number and hours worked of people
that belongs to Occupied or Unoccupied EAP, employment composition according both firm’s and
individual’s characteristics, average income and some other labor variables.
The main variables retrieved from this survey are if worker belongs to Occupied EAP and average
income; both according to gender, age and eduaction level. As the next subsection will explain,
these are the main demographic classifications used for our estimation. Also, we distinguish the
effects of the expectations index between formal and informal employment. To make this distinc-
tion, we used to what type of health insurance did the individual belonged the time it was surveyed.
The workers who belong to the public health insurance (called “ESSALUD” in Peru) or to a private
health insurance are considered as part of formal Occupied EAP.
The period covered for this paper is January-February-March in 2001 until the moving trimester
of June-July-August of 2012. However the moving quarter of October-November-December 2006
has no information regarding health insurance affiliation, which does not allows us to distinguish
between formal and informal employment. The reason is that in that moving trimester, INEI tried
to replace EPE for another survey, which did not included our identification variable for formality.
Nevertheless, this attempt was not very successful, so in the next moving quarter they return to
the EPE. Regrettably, we were informed by the same institution that our formal variable was not
accurate for the following two moving trimesters; so we decided to drop this three observations
from our database. Also, income variables started to belong to this survey in the moving quarter
of January-February-March of 2003. So, the number of observations for occupied EAP sums up to
133; and for average income, 113. However, the next subsection will explain how we treated data
to increase the number of observations to improve efficiency in our estimates.
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3.3 Methodology
To increase the performance of our estimation, we built a panel database. As it should be clear from
the description above, data is only available as repeated cross-section; the Permanent Employment
Survey does not poll each individual across time as panel data would require. To overcome this
issue, we worked with the average individual of each demographic group, in order to form a cohort
panel database. We worked with three cohort panel datasets: by gender (N=2), by age (N=3) and
by education level (N=4).
The groups division was the following. For the gender panel, we use the average men and women.
For the age panel, data only allowed us to work with the average individual of these three groups:
(i) employees from 14 to 24 years (young workers); (ii) from 25 to 44 years (medium workers)
and (iii) more than 45 years (older workers). Finally, for the education panel the four (mutually
exclusive) groups we used were: (i) workers with at most primary level, (ii) workers with at most
seconday level (but more than primary level), (iii) workers with non-university superior studies
and (iv) workers with university studies. To identify the expectations effect we estimate the model
using panel fixed effects.
The main reason we used data this way was to increase our sample size (multiplying by two, three
and four the number of observations if we worked with the gender, age or education panel; respec-
tively). As we mentioned earlier, our expectations index is almost full of zeros in a considerable
part of our sample. This is an important problem because this would increase the variance of our
estimates; which may lead to some misleading results. Indeed, working with time series could
detect that expectations did not have any effect at all but the explanation for this result could be the
high variance rather than the effect of expectations itself. Instead, working with a panel database
not only allows us to get more efficient results by exploiting time variability; but also by exploit-
ing variability across average agents of each demographic group. Also, it is worth noting that our
expectations index does not have cross-section variability; so a bigger N would not help to identify
the indirect impact caused through firm’s expectation; but it would help towards efficiency and the
identification of the expectations effects.
To further explain our main results, it is important to consider the following. The expectations index
contemporaneous value represents the earlier month with respect to the first one of the moving
trimester where the labor variables develop. Namely, the current value of the expectations index is
lagged one month with respect to occupied EAP and average income. This means that, for example,
if we consider the moving trimester of February-March-April 2012, then the “contemporaneous”
value for the expectations index is the corresponding to January 2012. In the same way, one lag of
the expectations index is the value for December 2011; and so on. We allow in our specifications
for at most three lags of our expectations index, which, in our example, would be the number of
news regarding PLGT in October 2011; that is, a four months lag, which we think is a reasonable
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time that expectations could be strenghtened. This would also allows us to discuss about whether
the expectations index could act as a leading behaviour (at least in our sample) of both employment
and average income.
To ensure the robustness of our estimations we included some control variables. First, we used GDP
in levels (millions of Nuevos soles of 1994); which shows the growth of the peruvian economy and
the agreggated income. Also, taking into account that employment and average income is deter-
mined as a supply-demand equilibrium; we need a labor supply shock that allows us identify the
real effect of firms’s expectations - captured by news - in their decisions. For that purpose, we used
the stock of universities in Peru each month. This variable represents the growth of skilled labor
and could be understood as a proxy of the rythm of graduates. Also, we used peruvian population
as another supply shock. Unfortunately, this variable was only available at an annual frequency.
For the age and gender panel datasets, we used the population according the demographic groups
established before; but for the education panel we only used population as an aggregate due to data
availability.
We also want to determine whether this expectations effect is higher in periods with low growth.The
main hypothesis is that in periods where the growth rate is higher, the effect of news towards this
law’s approval might diminish. During an economic boom, firm’s are usually washed away by the
favorable economic context; so it would take a strike of really bad news to hinder their impulse
to hire and to expand their business. On the other side, in periods with relative low economic
growth , firms are often more cautious to any sign of bad news that may appear in the market; so
their decisions may be more influentiable by news; portraying both the actual and the potential
economic context. This differential growth effect might also display (although in an indirect way)
an assymetric effect of news: bad news have a greater impact than good news (Garz, 2012).
For that purpose, we allow the effect from the expectations index to differ in two ways. First, we
consider that it may be a differential effect across the sample we consider. From 2001 to 2006 the
peruvian economy experienced a steady growth. According to the Central Reserve Bank, we went
from a negative real GDP growth in the first trimester of 2001 of 4.2% to 8.9% in the last quarter
of 2006; the highest peak in the whole subsample. This growth continued during 2007 and the
first semester of 2008; but in the second half of this year, the world financial crisis hinder peruvian
growth; mainly in 2009 and the first quarter of 2010. After this bump, Peru has experienced a high
growth level.
In order to identify different affects across different periods of growth, we created a dummy variable
which takes the value of one from the first moving quarter (January-February-March) of 2007 to
the end of the sample and zero otherwise. We consider the first subsample as the lower growth
period, having an average GDP growth rate of 4.72%; while after 2007 the average growth rate was
of 7.01%.
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The second way we identify differential growth effects is by taking into account real GDP growth
rate. The procedure is analogous to the previous case. We created a dummy variable which takes
the value of one if the real GDP growth rate of the correspondent month is greater than the average
of the full sample (which sums up to 5.99%). Again, to capture this differential growth effects, we
worked with interactions between our this dummy and the expectations index (and its lags). This
way, the coefficient of this interaction variable would be the additional impact of the expectations
index on employment and average income.
Finally, we tried to determine whether news has an increasing or decreasing effect. That is to say,
if a previous larger stock of news would make the effect of this additional new stronger or weaker.
The logic behind is that a larger stock of news, on one hand, would make the menace of a stricter
labor market more credible than if it is just a one time release; so its effect could be stronger. On
the other hand, the additional effect could be weaker because the previous large stock of news make
it less credible. If nothing has happened until now, why would this additional new be different? In
this sense, we also estimate previous models adding our news variable squared.
4 Results
4.1 A first approach: descriptive analysis
The direct impact of the General Labor Law project cannot be obtained since it has not been ap-
proved. Nevertheless, we can capture its indirect impact, whose transmission channel is expecta-
tions. Employers behaviour (i.e hiring, firing, investments) can be modified by their percepctions;
particularly, how strict a market is. Indeed, each firm would act very differently in a context where
employment protection is really high in contrast where regulation is not strong. News is one of the
possible channels that can alter firm’s perceptions. Local media can have a very strong influence
among employer’s expectations, which, if modified, may have an effect on some key variables such
as employment or informality. It is this indirect impact we are capturing by using the expectations
index.
Some first evidence of this effect can be drawn from a graphical analysis. The panel on the left in
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the expectations index together with occupied EAP. Here, it can be
seen a negative relation emerging. Indeed, in periods where news were more constant (from 2002
to the first half of 2004), in spite of the rapid economic growht of peruvian GDP; occupied EAP
growth seems to hinder. Also, from mid 2005 to the first semester of 2006, news reduced almost
to one per month. In this period, occupied EAP rose considerably; only to hinder when the LGT
proposal gain relevance in the end of 2006. Finally, it is worth noting that during the period where
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news were almost zero, occupied EAP shows a greater growth; only diminished by the financial
world crisis.
Figure 3: Relation of Expectations Index and Key variables
(a) Expectations Index and Occupied EAP (b) Expectations Index and Average Income
On the other hand, panel b in Figure 3 shows the evolution of the news index and the average
income of the occupied EAP. The relation between these two variables is less clear than occupied
EAP; but it can be inferred the same negative relation. In periods where monthly news were more
constant the average income seems to hinder. In contrast, when the expectations index is near zero,
the average income show some signs of growth.
This indirect effect can be decomposed by different type of workers according to demographic
groups. The evolution of the expectations index, the occuppied EAP and the average income by
gender, age and education level also seems to uncover a negative relation. The most pronounced
relation with employment is present in the young and less educated workers, as argued in the
literature(Garz, 2012). On the other side, older and more educated workers does not seems to be
affected by news. There is no observable difference between male and female workers. In the
case of average income, preliminary evidence is not that clear; although the same groups as before
seems to be the more affected by an expectation on more labor market rigidities.
This same statements can be inferred watching the sample characteristics presented in Table 1.
Column (1) describes the characteristics for the whole sample; while column (2) and (3) describes
those same characteristics for the subsample explained before. In particular, Column (2) covers
the period where the expectations index is different from zero in each month; while Column (3)
presents the same results but for the subsample where the expectation index is mainly zero in each
month.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Full Sample (1) 2001-3 to 2006-10 (2) 2007-1 to 2012-5 (3)
Occupied EAP
3940.09 3664.103 4220.26
(316.39) (115.80) (177.35)
Average Income
976.55 818.64 1084.22
(165.91) (25.86) (130.76)
Formal Occupied EAP
1170.14 959.74 1383.74
(252.05) (24.69) (190.88)
Formal Average Income
1121.304 977.12 1267.68
(171.63) (56.83) (115.54)
Expectations Index
1.61 2.05 1.17
(2.19) (2.23) (2.03)
Table 1 suggests there may be significant differences in periods with higher or fewer news. Indeed,
in periods with high amount of news related to the General Labor Law (Column(2)), the occupied
EAP and average income for both total and formal labor market is less than the average for the full
sample; while the opposite occurs when the expectations index is closer to zero (Column(3)). This
results are quite surprinsing taking into account that the first subsample is a period of a a steady
and accelerated economic growth; while the second subsample considers the deceleration caused
by the world financial crisis; which could diminished the level of both occuppied EAP and average
income. Namely, it may appear that firm’s expectations towards the law’s approval could explain
somewhat the evolution of employment and income in both subsamples.
4.2 Panel Estimation
We start our analysis by studying the total effect of expectations to both formal and informal em-
ployment and average income. Our results indicates that the discussion of the approval of the
General Labor Law had a negative effect on both Occupied EAP and wages on our three panel
datasets. Regarding employment, we can state that news related to a stricter future labor market,
while affects negatively to both formal and total occupied EAP, the impact on the former seems to
be much more stronger. On the other hand, expectations has also a negative effect on average in-
come and is higher in magnitude for overall occupied EAP; although evidence is not as conclusive
as in the case of employment. These results are robust to our three panel datasets.
If we focuss on the education panel (shown in Table 2), we would find some evidence of the results
above. Columns (1) and (2) shows the results for overall and formal Occupied EAP; respectively.
This order remains for average income; where Column (3) corresponds to all workers; while Col-
umn (4) only focus on formal employees. In these specifications, as discussed earlier, we include
three lags of our expectations index.
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Table 2 shows that expectations has a negative effect on employment. Taking into account the
treatment of our data, this estimates should be read as follow: for the case of the contemporaneous
value of the expectations index in formal employment,“one more new related to the approval of
the General Labor Law in the earlier month implies an average reduction in formal occupied EAP
of about 1.6 thousand workers in each group; in this case, in each one of the four education levels.
If we take the month with higher news (11 in April, 2005), this implies that evidencing an assymet-
ric effects of news.the reduction in formal employment in the next moving quarter of May-June-
July, 2005 was of approximately 70 400 workers.7 Now, taking the number of news in the previous
three months; the total effect would be of 119 240 employees; which represents 12.51% of formal
employment in this moving quarter.
Also, as discussed above, the effect of expectations is different whether we consider formal or
total employment. As seen from the two first columns, this impact is stronger in formal occupied
EAP. Analyzing first overall employment, we could say that the effect is not statistically significant
for any lag; except for the second one; and that its effect is -0.4. In return, the impact on formal
employment is much stronger and statistically significant for all three lags. The explanation for
this result could be that there exists a substitution effect between formal and informal employment.
Expectations regarding a stricter labor market affects mostly formal workers who now moves to
the informal sector, where, due to lack of enforcement, laws usually does not have an effect. This
leaves the overall employment almost unchanged.
Regarding wages, although evidence is not as conclusive, we can state that expectations has a
negative impact on average income. Column 3 in Table 2 shows that one more new related to the
General Labor Law released two months ago is associated with a reduction in wages of about two
nuevos soles for all workers. The impact of expectations is statistically significant for all three lags;
albeit the contemporaneous effect is not. This lagged response could be explained by wages rigidity.
Employers should be really confident about the future stricter labor market to reduce wages; not to
mention the existence of contracts.
Unlike employment, our results establish that the effect of expectations is greater in overall workers
compared to formal workers. Furthermore, expectations does not seem to have an effect on formal
average income. This results could be explained by simple demand and supply movements. As
seen before, news reduce mainly formal employment, resulting in an increase in the informal sector.
This situation leads, first a rise in the demand for informal workers since they less expensive for
the firm (because of expectations towards a stricter labro market). On the other side, the supply
of informal workers has also rosen because of the substitution effect. The resulting drop in wages
is an indicator that the change in the supply is greater than the change in the demand for informal
7 This quantity comes from multiplying 11*1.6*4; which is the number of news, our estimate and the number of
categories in that panel.
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employment. Formal worker’s average income does not change (as it should do since there are now
less formal workers) mainly because of rigidities caused by labor contracts.
Table 2: Education Panel: Employment and Average Income
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -.615 -1.608 0.223 0.293
(1.732) (0.64)∗∗ (1.564) (0.781)
News-1 -.444 -1.313 -2.009 1.026
(0.135)∗∗∗ (0.435)∗∗∗ (0.914)∗∗ (1.220)
News-2 -.280 -.903 -1.381 0.265
(0.324) (0.395)∗∗ (0.364)∗∗∗ (0.801)
News-3 0.006 -1.028 -4.268 -.263
(0.306) (0.469)∗∗ (2.388)∗ (0.395)
GDP 0.194 0.23 1.062 0.912
(0.4) (0.158) (0.272)∗∗∗ (0.348)∗∗∗
Univ 1.270 2.077 4.657 2.757
(0.82) (0.765)∗∗∗ (0.728)∗∗∗ (0.34)∗∗∗
Popul 44.553 19.621 50.274 90.725
(26.670)∗ (9.204)∗∗ (10.059)∗∗∗ (32.413)∗∗∗
N 484 464 444 464
R2 0.529 0.671 0.859 0.796
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
There results are robust to the other two panels; although there exists some differences regarding
the magnitude of these effects. Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix shows the result for the age and
gender panel, respectively. The negative effect of expectations on both wages and employment
still remains, as well as the different impact of news on formal and overall employment. The main
difference with previous results is the size of this effects.
For the age panel, again analyzing the month with higher news, we get a reduction of about 79 200
in formal employment for the moving trimester of May-June-July, 2005.; while considering the
gender panel leads to a decrease of 81 400 workers. Furthermore, the aggregated effect considering
the three previous months would be of 137 460 and 141 468 workers for the age and gender panel;
respectively. This means that the total effect for this quarter, taking into account all three panels,
fluctuate from a reduction of 12.51% to 14.85% in formal employment.
Finally, the effect of expectations on average income is still larger for overall workers compared
to formal employment. Nevertheless, in the two last panels we find a statistically negative impact
of news in both groups; although the magnitude is greater in the former than in the latter. The
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explanation for this result is again the rigidity brought by labor contracts between the firm and the
worker.
4.3 Heterogeneous growth effects
In this section we analyze whether there is a different impact of expectations in both employment
and average income in periods with high versus low growth. As explained earlier, we identify this
heterogeneous effects in two ways: (i) a dummy variable taking the value of one after the mov-
ing trimester of January-February-March of 2007; which represents a period with relative lower
growth; and (ii) another dummy variable taking the value of one if the real GDP growth in each
month is greater than the sample average (5.86%). Our variable of interest would be the interac-
tion between these dummies and the expectations index; capturing the latter’s additional impact in
periods with low and high growth; respectively.
Our results show that in periods with higher growth (after 2007), the effect of news related to a
stricter labor market had a stronger negative effect in both occupied EAP and average income.
Nevertheless, this differential impact is not robust to all three panels. Regarding employment, this
differential effect only appears statistically significant in the education and the gender panel. On
the other hand, the negative effect of expectations on average income is robust to the three panels;
having a stronger impact in period of relatively higher growth only for wages of all workers. This
same effect in formal workers’s average income does not seem to be statistically different after
2007.
The results for the gender panel are shown in Table 8 in the Appendix. As can be seen, after 2007,
the negative effect of expectations on formal employment stregthened. Indeed, one more new a
month earlier to the moving trimester before this year implies a reduction of approximately 3.65
thousand formal workers; while in a moving quarter after 2007, this negative impact rises, now
leading to a reduction of 4.85 thousand formal workers. A similar result could be obtained from
the education panel in Table 6, although with a different size effect.
Analyzing overall employment in the gender panel, we arrived to a different result. The effects
of expectations towards a stricter labor market on aggregated employment is still negative before
2007. However, after the first moving quarter of 2007, the effects of news becomes statistically
zero or even positive for some lags. This result reinforces the previous substitution effect. A future
perspective of more labor rigidities leads to less formal employment and a bigger informal labor
market in the economy; and this substitution is stronger in periods with high growth.
In return, the effect on average income seems to be robust to all three panels. As can be seen,
it appears that there exists a negative relation between expectations and average income; and this
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negative effect is greater after 2007. Focusing on the education panel, one more new two months
earlier after 2007 causes an additional decrease of 1.71 nuevos soles; compared to this same effect
before 2007. This relation does not change when analyzing the results for the other two panel (only
differs in terms of magnitude); which are shown in Tables 6 (education) and 7 (age).
One main limitation of these first approach is our expectations index. As discussed above, the
number of news related to the General Labor Law dropped to zero from 2008 to early 2011 as
the topic lost relevance. This data problem does not allows us to correctly identify the effect of
expectations after 2007, precisely because in almost the half of this subsample our main variable
takes the value of zero. This could be a plausible explanation for the little robustness of the results
presented above.
In this sense, to increase the identification of this heterogeneous growth effect, we used a second
approach. This one is based on a classification of each period with a dummy variable according
to real GDP growth; taking the value of one if it was higher than the average sample growth. This
way, we avoid the problem arose earlier regarding the quantity of zeros of our expectations variable.
Indeed, there were 29 months with a growth higher than average before 2007; while after this year
the number of months were 40; reassuring the avoidance of the previous difficulty.
Our results indicates that a higher number of news is still related with a reduction in employment;
but this effect is weaker in periods with high growth. However, evidence from this last finding
is far from being conclusive. The expectation’s stronger negative effect in periods with lower
GDP growth on both overall and formal employment appears to be only significant in the age and
gender panel (shown in Tables 10 and 11, respectively); while this same impact obtained from the
education panel is not statistically significant (shown in Table 9).
Analyzing the efbut only applying to its contemporaneous value; not its lagsfect on the gender
panel, we find that the effect of news on employment is reduced when the economy is growing
above its mean rate. An extra new released two months earlier leads to a decrease in formal em-
ployment of about 3.74 thousand workers in months with lower than average growth; while this
effect is diminished to a reduction of 2.22 thousand employees when analyzing months with a
growth rate above 5.86%. If we analyze the age panel, we could state that, when we consider
growth heterogeneous effects, the negative effect of the expectations index is reinforced only in
formal occupied EAP. This result could represent some evidence in favour of the labor substitution
between formal and informal employment in periods of high growth.
Finally, regarding average income, these estimation suggests that higher expectations towards a
stricter labor market have a stronger negative effect on average income in periods with high growth;
in line with the results found when using our year dummy. Hence, this means that, although we
cannot be confident about the magnitude, we can state that there exists a differential impact of
expectations in higher versus lower growth periods in both employment and average income.
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4.4 Cumulative Effects
We also calculated if expectations had a cumulative effect; that is, whether the effect of news on
employment and income is increasing or decreasing. For this purpose, we included in previous
estimations news squared. We only worked with formal employment and average income. Results
for the three panels are shown in Tables 13 to 14. As can be seen, news seems to have a negative
but decreasing effect on both employment and average income. This cumulative feature seems to
hold in the three panels, although the magnitude differs in each one.
Our results suggests that news have a negative but decreasing effect. This means that one extra
new has a weaker effect if in previous months there was a larger stock of news. This finding makes
perfect sense. An extra new released when previous tindings had already been published may make
the future stricter threat less credible; so the firm may be less willing to react.
Indeed, too much news could decrease the credibility of this threat since each additional new itself
becomes less believable. If nothing happened when previous news were released, why now would
be different? On the other hand, if it is a one time release it might have a larger effect as it represents
a first impression, making firms be more cautious towards this possible threat.
4.5 Alternative Specifications
This section presents some alternative specifications from our previous estimation. First, we es-
timate for each panel the impact of our expectations index up to three lags on each of our labor
variables; introducing each one of them sequentially without controlling for any other effect. Re-
sults are shown from Tables 19 to 26. It can be seen that this estimation is considerable upwardly
biased compared to the results presented above.
We arrived to this same conclussion when we analyze also heterogeneous growth effects without
controlling for other variables. Main findings obtained above does not change so much; the main
difference is in terms of magnitude. These estimations ares shown from Tables 31 to 38 in the
Appendix. To correct this bias we added the control variables mentioned before: GDP levels (in
millions), population and stock of universities each quarter. As can be seen from Tables 43 to
50, the effect of expectations reduces considerably when we control for this supply shocks; even
making statistically zero this impact for overall employment. Columns (3) and (6) of this group of
Tables for each panel are the ones presented above.
We also were interested in calculating differential effects across the demographic groups we estab-
lished for our panel. For that purpose, we created dummy variables according to each category in
every panel dataset. Since this identification method for heterogeneous demographic impacts using
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a fixed effects estimation was not very clear, we also used a pool estimation for each panel. Tables
55 to 62 shows this results. Our findings regarding this effects are really vague, as it is hard to
find some robust and credible estimates across all panels. Nevertheless, at a very general level, we
can state that greater expectations for more labor rigidities affects more the female and youngest
workers.
5 Conclussions
The effects of regulations is far from being neutral. Until recently, literature has focused mainly
on the direct impact of stricter Employment Protection Legistlation; obtaining different results on
whether it rises or decreases both employment and average income. Nevertheless, most of these
studies have not taken into account that firms are rational agents who reacts not only after the
change in labor rigidities; but also before its implementation if they have some strong evidence of
these future changes. This paper has estimated this indirect, ex-ante channel that embodies firms’s
expectations.
For this purpose, we use the proposal of the General Labor Law. This project was first released in
2001 and has been discussed since then; but has not yet been approved. This law mainly proposes
higher rigidities in the labor market. Namely, it seeks to increase the compensation for unfair
dismissal, reduce the duration of temporary contracts and rise the cost of incorporation as a cause
of wrongful dismissal cases referred to the Constitutional Court. In this sense, we use the number
of news related to the approval of the General Labor Law as a mechanism to account for firm’s
expectations.
Our findings shows little doubt that expectations in Peru plays a significant role in firm’s decisions.
Higher news related to a future stringent market leads to a reduction in both employment and
average income. However, this negative effect of expectations is mainly in formal employment,
suggesting a substitution of formal to informal labor. This means that expectations towards stricter
labor rigidities causes an increase in the informal labor market by reducing formal employment.
Expectations also have a negative impact on average income; affecting mainly wages for all workers
rather than only formal. a reasonable explanation for this finding is that the supply change is
greater than the demand change in labor; as well as the effect of contracts rigidity. Our results
allows us to aseverate that the effect of expectations is different between periods with higher and
lower GDP growth rates; although direction and magnitude cannot be stated as conclusively as
previous results. Finally, we discover some evidence supporting that news have a decreasing effect
in both employment and average income. What is behind this result is credibility. A larger stock of
previous news would make an extra one less believable since these previous news entailed no real
impact on legislation.
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The analysis reinforces the idea that government regulations do not always met their goals. When
implementing Employment Protection, policy-makers should be really careful since they, uninten-
tionally, do not always take into account the real consequences of this legislations. There are many
channels through which stricter labor rigidities can have an important impact on agents behaviour
even if it has not yet been implemented, being an important one expectations. Although it is al-
most impossible that the policy makers could account for all of them, they must be more analytic
when making such an important decision. Future research involving this other channels will be of
considerable help to understand genuinely the impact of labor regulations.
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Appendix
Variables Used
Table 3: Variables Description
Variable Source Description
Occupied EAP
Permanent Total number of employed workers for each moving quarter.
Employment Survey Available at worker’s characteristics: gender, age and education level.
Average Permanent The average income of all employed workers for each moving quarter.
Income Employment Survey Available at worker’s characteristics: gender, age and education level.
Formal Permanent Total number of formal employed workers in each moving quarter. Formal is
Occupied EAP Employment Survey defined as having health insurance. Available at worker’s characteristics.
Formal Permanent Average income for all formal employed workers.
Average Income Employment Survey Available at worker’s characteristics: gender, age and education level.
Expectations
Gestion
A monthly series that compilates number of news related to
Index the General Labor Law from January 2001 to May of 2012.
GDP
Central Reserve It is expressed in millions. A quarterly series that goes from
Bank the first quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of 2012.
Stock of National Assembly A monthly series thar accounts for the number of public
Universities of Rectors and private universities in Peru in each month since 2001.
Population
National Institute of Total number of habitants in Peru expressed in millions, also divided by
Statistics and Informatics worker’s characteristics: gender and age. Not available by education level.
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Table 4: Age Panel: Employment and Average Income
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -.725 -2.471 1.225 -1.895
(0.402)∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (1.619) (0.325)∗∗∗
News-1 -.450 -1.921 -1.221 -.464
(0.67) (0.626)∗∗∗ (0.524)∗∗ (1.285)
News-2 -.262 -1.527 -2.555 -.886
(0.467) (0.702)∗∗ (0.211)∗∗∗ (0.506)∗
News-3 0.159 -1.847 -2.748 -1.857
(0.692) (0.74)∗∗ (0.731)∗∗∗ (0.529)∗∗∗
GDP 0.31 0.495 1.329 1.804
(0.066)∗∗∗ (0.175)∗∗∗ (0.166)∗∗∗ (0.215)∗∗∗
Univ 2.043 3.403 4.649 3.690
(1.172)∗ (1.460)∗∗ (0.511)∗∗∗ (0.937)∗∗∗
Popul 161.316 29.981 173.103 224.126
(83.903)∗ (81.415) (24.113)∗∗∗ (52.717)∗∗∗
N 390 390 333 390
R2 0.812 0.722 0.932 0.904
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Gender Panel: Employment and Average Income
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ind-exp -1.117 -3.701 1.086 -1.322
(0.801) (0.285)∗∗∗ (0.43)∗∗ (0.564)∗∗
L.ind-exp -.769 -2.956 -1.569 -.592
(0.277)∗∗∗ (0.448)∗∗∗ (0.293)∗∗∗ (0.367)
L2.ind-exp -.497 -2.375 -2.313 -.709
(0.519) (0.476)∗∗∗ (0.132)∗∗∗ (0.178)∗∗∗
L3.ind-exp 0.047 -2.877 -3.476 -1.634
(0.964) (0.548)∗∗∗ (0.885)∗∗∗ (0.511)∗∗∗
pbi-niv 0.364 0.643 1.237 1.489
(0.355) (0.231)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.207)∗∗∗
univ 2.448 4.595 4.478 3.401
(0.21)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗ (1.515)∗∗∗ (0.601)∗∗∗
pob-gend 189.848 50.624 139.797 156.376
(11.865)∗∗∗ (22.853)∗∗ (0.277)∗∗∗ (13.384)∗∗∗
N 260 260 222 260
R2 0.947 0.934 0.925 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Differential Growth Effects
Table 6: Education Panel: Employment and Average Income with year heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -.853 -1.249 0.539 -.766
(1.405) (0.604)∗∗ (2.815) (0.325)∗∗
News-1 -1.133 -.902 -1.136 0.811
(0.413)∗∗∗ (0.359)∗∗ (1.040) (1.121)
News-2 -.784 -.452 0.215 -.337
(0.713) (0.39) (0.754) (0.534)
News-3 -.683 -1.197 -5.287 -1.071
(1.342) (1.080) (3.649) (1.151)
News-Year 0.203 -1.157 -1.855 2.293
(1.613) (0.686)∗ (4.041) (1.904)
News-Year-1 1.471 -.575 -.990 0.186
(1.035) (0.213)∗∗∗ (0.905) (1.026)
News-Year-2 0.834 -1.040 -3.468 1.404
(1.474) (0.37)∗∗∗ (0.749)∗∗∗ (1.529)
News-Year-3 1.198 0.901 3.112 0.678
(2.928) (1.887) (3.887) (1.998)
GDP 0.206 0.221 1.037 0.923
(0.398) (0.155) (0.285)∗∗∗ (0.362)∗∗
Univ 1.355 2.044 4.593 2.856
(0.763)∗ (0.779)∗∗∗ (0.803)∗∗∗ (0.295)∗∗∗
Popul 40.520 21.609 54.008 85.621
(25.349) (9.680)∗∗ (10.385)∗∗∗ (29.271)∗∗∗
N 484 464 444 464
R2 0.53 0.672 0.86 0.796
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Year is the interaction between
our year dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_year 1, 2 and 3 represents the
interaction between our year dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 7: Age Panel: Employment and Average Income with year heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -.768 -2.460 2.025 -3.364
(0.413)∗ (0.735)∗∗∗ (2.364) (0.403)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.198 -1.619 -.389 -1.377
(0.753) (0.624)∗∗∗ (0.746) (0.935)
News-2 -.763 -1.210 -2.681 -1.291
(0.493) (0.542)∗∗ (1.231)∗∗ (0.2)∗∗∗
News-3 -.474 -2.716 -3.372 -3.213
(0.9) (1.416)∗ (0.241)∗∗∗ (0.915)∗∗∗
News-Year -.131 -.809 -2.397 3.484
(0.993) (0.904) (1.852) (1.143)∗∗∗
News-Year-1 1.830 -.286 -1.330 2.124
(0.417)∗∗∗ (0.453) (0.904) (1.242)∗
News-Year-2 0.98 -.857 -.025 1.282
(1.078) (0.499)∗ (1.755) (1.413)
News-Year-3 1.440 2.307 2.042 1.836
(0.806)∗ (1.675) (2.010) (1.696)
GDP 0.286 0.486 1.333 1.741
(0.076)∗∗∗ (0.165)∗∗∗ (0.175)∗∗∗ (0.196)∗∗∗
Univ 1.990 3.409 4.684 3.560
(1.211) (1.454)∗∗ (0.521)∗∗∗ (0.921)∗∗∗
Popul 158.695 29.518 174.703 219.192
(84.885)∗ (82.193) (21.539)∗∗∗ (50.910)∗∗∗
N 390 390 333 390
R2 0.814 0.722 0.932 0.906
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Year is the interaction between
our year dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_year 1, 2 and 3 represents the
interaction between our year dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 8: Gender Panel: Employment and Average Income with year heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -1.192 -3.645 1.746 -2.678
(2.086) (0.505)∗∗∗ (1.568) (0.065)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.752 -2.386 -.513 -1.101
(0.406)∗∗∗ (0.42)∗∗∗ (0.42) (0.164)∗∗∗
News-2 -1.087 -1.820 -1.345 -.693
(0.734) (0.751)∗∗ (0.146)∗∗∗ (0.101)∗∗∗
News-3 -.643 -3.961 -3.015 -2.200
(0.173)∗∗∗ (1.012)∗∗∗ (1.829)∗ (0.827)∗∗∗
News-Year -.063 -1.205 -1.546 3.548
(3.048) (0.378)∗∗∗ (3.443) (0.87)∗∗∗
News-Year-1 2.369 -.752 -1.856 1.027
(0.277)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.851)∗∗ (0.816)
News-Year-2 1.156 -1.437 -1.857 0.435
(0.022)∗∗∗ (0.659)∗∗ (0.439)∗∗∗ (0.224)∗
News-Year-3 1.552 2.966 -.073 0.069
(0.772)∗∗ (0.88)∗∗∗ (3.101) (2.777)
GDP 0.354 0.636 1.201 1.465
(0.334) (0.224)∗∗∗ (0.046)∗∗∗ (0.232)∗∗∗
Univ 2.477 4.619 4.317 3.392
(0.22)∗∗∗ (0.126)∗∗∗ (1.538)∗∗∗ (0.58)∗∗∗
Popul 183.988 50.454 154.729 151.638
(8.908)∗∗∗ (20.894)∗∗ (1.895)∗∗∗ (18.920)∗∗∗
N 260 260 222 260
R2 0.948 0.934 0.927 0.921
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Year is the interaction between
our year dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_year 1, 2 and 3 represents the
interaction between our year dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 9: Education Panel: Employment and Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -1.233 -1.024 3.091 2.857
(1.292) (0.498)∗∗ (3.649) (1.095)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.125 -1.259 1.087 -.217
(0.315)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.561)∗ (0.908)
News-2 -.075 -.366 0.724 -.248
(1.193) (0.303) (0.283)∗∗ (1.298)
News-3 0.433 -.720 -4.284 -1.786
(1.407) (0.842) (4.962) (1.992)
News-Growth 0.922 -.943 -3.824 -4.143
(1.081) (0.622) (2.861) (0.729)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 0.985 0.167 -3.911 2.130
(0.584)∗ (0.338) (1.477)∗∗∗ (1.052)∗∗
News-Growth-2 -.336 -.787 -3.043 0.73
(1.779) (0.179)∗∗∗ (1.185)∗∗ (1.970)
News-Growth-3 -.797 -.328 1.082 2.160
(1.774) (0.872) (4.353) (2.895)
GDP 0.198 0.23 1.020 0.919
(0.403) (0.156) (0.272)∗∗∗ (0.347)∗∗∗
Univ 1.323 1.960 3.992 2.737
(0.732)∗ (0.751)∗∗∗ (0.666)∗∗∗ (0.228)∗∗∗
Popul 43.307 22.008 65.130 91.072
(27.554) (10.063)∗∗ (12.490)∗∗∗ (28.474)∗∗∗
N 484 464 444 464
R2 0.529 0.672 0.863 0.796
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 10: Age Panel: Employment and Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -1.487 -2.148 3.848 0.498
(1.366) (1.129)∗ (3.062) (0.652)
News-1 -1.280 -2.556 -.588 -4.284
(1.386) (0.765)∗∗∗ (0.976) (1.117)∗∗∗
News-2 -.109 -.940 -.778 -.189
(0.966) (0.777) (0.848) (0.715)
News-3 0.644 -1.901 -1.751 -2.763
(0.187)∗∗∗ (0.974)∗ (0.256)∗∗∗ (1.247)∗∗
News-Growth 1.227 -.565 -4.187 -4.038
(1.666) (1.796) (2.264)∗ (1.563)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 1.208 1.084 -.189 6.119
(1.021) (0.149)∗∗∗ (1.265) (2.135)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -.221 -1.023 -2.568 -1.217
(1.042) (1.435) (1.461)∗ (0.524)∗∗
News-Growth-3 -.912 0.123 -1.208 1.008
(1.128) (0.545) (0.611)∗∗ (1.614)
GDP 0.3 0.504 1.398 1.819
(0.07)∗∗∗ (0.185)∗∗∗ (0.177)∗∗∗ (0.235)∗∗∗
Univ 2.063 3.386 4.452 3.674
(1.228)∗ (1.487)∗∗ (0.353)∗∗∗ (0.954)∗∗∗
Popul 159.883 30.470 183.958 223.514
(86.437)∗ (84.858) (17.376)∗∗∗ (54.150)∗∗∗
N 390 390 333 390
R2 0.813 0.722 0.935 0.905
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 11: Gender Panel: Employment and Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -1.721 -2.722 3.967 0.363
(1.234) (0.472)∗∗∗ (1.053)∗∗∗ (1.408)
News-1 -1.804 -3.735 0.228 -3.154
(0.366)∗∗∗ (0.836)∗∗∗ (0.342) (0.742)∗∗∗
News-2 -.002 -1.263 -.157 -.314
(0.4) (1.077) (0.894) (0.695)
News-3 1.003 -2.824 -1.842 -2.814
(0.208)∗∗∗ (1.703)∗ (1.956) (0.94)∗∗∗
News-Growth 0.874 -1.713 -4.173 -2.762
(0.846) (1.128) (0.85)∗∗∗ (1.231)∗∗
News-Growth-1 1.684 1.517 -1.752 3.999
(0.376)∗∗∗ (0.427)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (1.439)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -.754 -1.912 -2.832 -.761
(0.1)∗∗∗ (0.936)∗∗ (1.825) (1.396)
News-Growth-3 -1.624 0.058 -1.741 1.590
(1.217) (1.677) (1.944) (1.976)
GDP 0.368 0.659 1.202 1.498
(0.35) (0.228)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.217)∗∗∗
Univ 2.457 4.478 3.767 3.433
(0.131)∗∗∗ (0.183)∗∗∗ (1.492)∗∗ (0.476)∗∗∗
Popul 189.049 54.639 171.981 154.512
(8.994)∗∗∗ (20.570)∗∗∗ (0.242)∗∗∗ (18.454)∗∗∗
N 260 260 222 260
R2 0.947 0.934 0.93 0.921
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Cumulative Effects
Table 12: Education Panel with quadratic terms: Formal Employment and Average Income
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -4.826 -3.822 -2.418 -12.241 -9.909 -2.807
(1.936)∗∗ (1.574)∗∗ (1.208)∗∗ (3.852)∗∗∗ (3.439)∗∗∗ (0.944)∗∗∗
News-sqr 0.405 0.29 0.127 1.485 1.218 0.395
(0.168)∗∗ (0.127)∗∗ (0.092) (0.528)∗∗∗ (0.484)∗∗ (0.225)∗
News-1 -9.156 -3.395 -1.915 -21.401 -8.028 -.541
(3.573)∗∗ (1.511)∗∗ (1.047)∗ (4.027)∗∗∗ (1.568)∗∗∗ (1.186)
News-sqr-1 0.925 0.283 0.099 2.612 1.122 0.191
(0.379)∗∗ (0.158)∗ (0.121) (0.559)∗∗∗ (0.308)∗∗∗ (0.148)
News-2 -9.565 -3.290 -2.049 -18.504 -3.936 2.342
(3.566)∗∗∗ (1.282)∗∗ (0.823)∗∗ (3.092)∗∗∗ (1.170)∗∗∗ (2.239)
News-sqr-2 0.877 0.3 0.158 1.766 0.426 -.288
(0.321)∗∗∗ (0.113)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗ (0.317)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗ (0.242)
News-3 -10.610 -3.317 -2.422 -18.315 -1.384 3.146
(3.881)∗∗∗ (1.263)∗∗∗ (0.853)∗∗∗ (3.617)∗∗∗ (1.140) (1.555)∗∗
News-sqr-3 0.942 0.297 0.196 1.568 0.071 -.441
(0.336)∗∗∗ (0.101)∗∗∗ (0.062)∗∗∗ (0.34)∗∗∗ (0.147) (0.192)∗∗
GDP 2.435 0.415 0.24 6.460 1.770 0.884
(0.86)∗∗∗ (0.22)∗ (0.156) (1.497)∗∗∗ (0.629)∗∗∗ (0.332)∗∗∗
Univ 2.913 2.129 6.762 2.798
(1.070)∗∗∗ (0.797)∗∗∗ (1.258)∗∗∗ (0.31)∗∗∗
Popul 17.858 90.347
(8.984)∗∗ (33.070)∗∗∗
N 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.387 0.665 0.672 0.446 0.761 0.797
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sqr is the square of the expecta-
tions index. Similarly, News_sqr 1, 2 and 3 represents the square of the first, second and third lag of the News variable;
respectively.
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Table 13: Age Panel with quadratic terms: Formal Employment and Average Income
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -3.982 -4.327 -3.931 -9.082 -9.754 -6.679
(0.616)∗∗∗ (0.746)∗∗∗ (1.155)∗∗∗ (4.303)∗∗ (4.415)∗∗ (2.749)∗∗
News-sqr 0.295 0.296 0.244 1.054 1.057 0.65
(0.056)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.14)∗ (0.531)∗∗ (0.532)∗∗ (0.324)∗∗
News-1 -8.757 -3.489 -3.154 -16.061 -5.770 -3.164
(3.260)∗∗∗ (1.179)∗∗∗ (1.031)∗∗∗ (3.352)∗∗∗ (1.733)∗∗∗ (0.395)∗∗∗
News-sqr-1 0.885 0.261 0.211 1.965 0.746 0.355
(0.361)∗∗ (0.125)∗∗ (0.076)∗∗∗ (0.573)∗∗∗ (0.385)∗ (0.202)∗
News-2 -9.783 -3.716 -3.477 -12.155 -.306 1.559
(4.412)∗∗ (2.013)∗ (1.861)∗ (1.959)∗∗∗ (1.688) (2.530)
News-sqr-2 0.853 0.321 0.288 0.947 -.092 -.348
(0.403)∗∗ (0.193)∗ (0.168)∗ (0.24)∗∗∗ (0.217) (0.295)
News-3 -12.057 -4.257 -4.145 -13.822 1.414 2.280
(5.005)∗∗ (1.920)∗∗ (1.854)∗∗ (3.214)∗∗∗ (2.907) (3.492)
News-sqr-3 1.042 0.36 0.34 0.942 -.391 -.544
(0.448)∗∗ (0.178)∗∗ (0.167)∗∗ (0.392)∗∗ (0.428) (0.489)
GDP 3.729 0.571 0.48 8.633 2.464 1.758
(1.545)∗∗ (0.337)∗ (0.177)∗∗∗ (1.505)∗∗∗ (0.518)∗∗∗ (0.194)∗∗∗
Univ 3.890 3.392 7.598 3.726
(1.542)∗∗ (1.476)∗∗ (1.237)∗∗∗ (0.914)∗∗∗
Popul 28.679 223.164
(82.249) (52.697)∗∗∗
N 390 390 390 390 390 390
R2 0.397 0.719 0.724 0.483 0.825 0.905
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sqr is the square of the expecta-
tions index. Similarly, News_sqr 1, 2 and 3 represents the square of the first, second and third lag of the News variable;
respectively.
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Table 14: Gender Panel with quadratic terms: Formal Employment and Average Income
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -5.960 -6.476 -5.536 -8.113 -8.766 -5.705
(0.421)∗∗∗ (0.485)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (1.744)∗∗∗ (1.839)∗∗∗ (1.455)∗∗∗
News-sqr 0.437 0.439 0.311 1.011 1.014 0.598
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.132)∗∗∗ (0.133)∗∗∗ (0.092)∗∗∗
News-1 -13.174 -5.276 -4.489 -14.661 -4.670 -2.109
(2.143)∗∗∗ (1.183)∗∗∗ (0.771)∗∗∗ (1.469)∗∗∗ (0.069)∗∗∗ (0.289)∗∗∗
News-sqr-1 1.326 0.391 0.269 1.790 0.607 0.21
(0.221)∗∗∗ (0.108)∗∗∗ (0.048)∗∗∗ (0.098)∗∗∗ (0.068)∗∗∗ (0.111)∗
News-2 -14.749 -5.656 -5.108 -12.528 -1.026 0.758
(1.837)∗∗∗ (0.731)∗∗∗ (0.428)∗∗∗ (0.782)∗∗∗ (0.832) (1.135)
News-sqr-2 1.281 0.483 0.404 1.055 0.046 -.212
(0.14)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.173) (0.202)
News-3 -18.239 -6.546 -6.345 -14.452 0.338 0.993
(3.168)∗∗∗ (1.748)∗∗∗ (1.581)∗∗∗ (0.425)∗∗∗ (1.652) (1.956)
News-sqr-3 1.576 0.554 0.509 1.105 -.189 -.335
(0.287)∗∗∗ (0.162)∗∗∗ (0.138)∗∗∗ (0.133)∗∗∗ (0.315) (0.341)
GDP 5.584 0.85 0.635 8.141 2.153 1.452
(0.925)∗∗∗ (0.349)∗∗ (0.239)∗∗∗ (1.128)∗∗∗ (0.289)∗∗∗ (0.198)∗∗∗
Univ 5.831 4.628 7.376 3.456
(0.711)∗∗∗ (0.116)∗∗∗ (1.036)∗∗∗ (0.611)∗∗∗
Popul 47.494 154.680
(22.787)∗∗ (14.349)∗∗∗
N 260 260 260 260 260 260
R2 0.513 0.929 0.935 0.506 0.885 0.921
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sqr is the square of the expecta-
tions index. Similarly, News_sqr 1, 2 and 3 represents the square of the first, second and third lag of the News variable;
respectively.
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Alternative Specifications
Expectation Index and Lags
Table 15: Education Panel: Employment
Overall Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -9.313 -5.931 -4.845 -4.439
(4.676)∗∗ (3.310)∗ (2.849)∗ (2.701)
News-1 -7.057 -4.880 -4.230
(3.069)∗∗ (2.092)∗∗ (1.831)∗∗
News-2 -5.624 -4.051
(2.560)∗∗ (1.921)∗∗
News-3 -4.277
(1.758)∗∗
N 484 484 484 484
R2 0.044 0.064 0.076 0.083
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 16: Education Panel: Average Income
Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -19.395 -12.054 -9.576 -7.950
(1.753)∗∗∗ (0.486)∗∗∗ (0.409)∗∗∗ (0.711)∗∗∗
News-1 -14.904 -10.225 -8.285
(2.910)∗∗∗ (2.091)∗∗∗ (1.597)∗∗∗
News-2 -11.983 -7.601
(2.116)∗∗∗ (1.005)∗∗∗
News-3 -12.197
(3.181)∗∗∗
N 444 444 444 444
R2 0.08 0.115 0.137 0.16
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 17: Education Panel: Formal Employment
Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -9.961 -6.563 -5.603 -5.174
(3.619)∗∗∗ (2.396)∗∗∗ (2.030)∗∗∗ (1.870)∗∗∗
News-1 -6.988 -4.957 -4.329
(2.533)∗∗∗ (1.756)∗∗∗ (1.519)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.093 -3.547
(1.961)∗∗∗ (1.371)∗∗∗
News-3 -4.102
(1.575)∗∗∗
N 464 464 464 464
R2 0.088 0.121 0.138 0.149
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 18: Education Panel: Formal Average Income
Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -18.099 -12.269 -10.481 -9.642
(3.627)∗∗∗ (2.516)∗∗∗ (2.218)∗∗∗ (2.069)∗∗∗
News-1 -11.993 -8.210 -6.983
(2.346)∗∗∗ (1.737)∗∗∗ (1.554)∗∗∗
News-2 -9.483 -6.462
(1.695)∗∗∗ (1.148)∗∗∗
News-3 -8.017
(1.526)∗∗∗
N 464 464 464 464
R2 0.061 0.082 0.094 0.103
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 19: Age Panel: Employment
Overall Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -8.083 -5.706 -5.228 -5.218
(3.058)∗∗∗ (1.979)∗∗∗ (1.752)∗∗∗ (1.714)∗∗∗
News-1 -5.570 -4.191 -3.907
(2.568)∗∗ (1.931)∗∗ (1.760)∗∗
News-2 -4.134 -3.211
(1.893)∗∗ (1.357)∗∗
News-3 -3.077
(1.643)∗
N 399 396 393 390
R2 0.022 0.033 0.041 0.049
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 20: Age Panel: Average Income
Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -19.174 -11.857 -9.143 -7.659
(1.728)∗∗∗ (1.057)∗∗∗ (0.954)∗∗∗ (0.892)∗∗∗
News-1 -14.855 -9.730 -7.959
(1.664)∗∗∗ (1.062)∗∗∗ (0.777)∗∗∗
News-2 -13.123 -9.123
(1.668)∗∗∗ (1.029)∗∗∗
News-3 -11.137
(1.878)∗∗∗
N 333 333 333 333
R2 0.073 0.107 0.132 0.149
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 21: Age Panel: Formal Employment
Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -10.310 -6.926 -6.072 -5.818
(3.514)∗∗∗ (2.284)∗∗∗ (1.933)∗∗∗ (1.833)∗∗∗
News-1 -7.285 -5.259 -4.666
(2.691)∗∗∗ (1.865)∗∗∗ (1.639)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.422 -3.857
(2.197)∗∗ (1.594)∗∗
News-3 -4.471
(1.728)∗∗∗
N 399 396 393 390
R2 0.055 0.078 0.093 0.105
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 22: Age Panel: Formal Average Income
Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -15.585 -11.152 -10.056 -9.783
(2.050)∗∗∗ (2.010)∗∗∗ (1.980)∗∗∗ (1.950)∗∗∗
News-1 -9.954 -7.205 -6.389
(0.799)∗∗∗ (0.683)∗∗∗ (0.646)∗∗∗
News-2 -7.626 -5.358
(0.849)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗
News-3 -6.781
(1.411)∗∗∗
N 399 396 393 390
R2 0.034 0.047 0.057 0.066
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 23: Gender Panel: Employment
Overall Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -12.127 -8.561 -7.845 -7.830
(1.028)∗∗∗ (1.175)∗∗∗ (1.307)∗∗∗ (1.392)∗∗∗
News-1 -8.351 -6.283 -5.856
(0.271)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗
News-2 -6.202 -4.817
(0.615)∗∗∗ (0.328)∗∗∗
News-3 -4.616
(0.713)∗∗∗
N 266 264 262 260
R2 0.028 0.041 0.052 0.061
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 24: Gender Panel: Average Income
Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -20.374 -12.613 -9.810 -8.182
(3.301)∗∗∗ (1.873)∗∗∗ (1.375)∗∗∗ (1.031)∗∗∗
News-1 -15.759 -10.467 -8.525
(2.914)∗∗∗ (1.973)∗∗∗ (1.563)∗∗∗
News-2 -13.551 -9.164
(2.426)∗∗∗ (1.495)∗∗∗
News-3 -12.213
(2.609)∗∗∗
N 222 222 222 222
R2 0.079 0.115 0.14 0.16
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 25: Gender Panel: Formal Employment
Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -15.557 -10.436 -9.136 -8.748
(2.188)∗∗∗ (1.403)∗∗∗ (1.198)∗∗∗ (1.149)∗∗∗
News-1 -11.021 -7.944 -7.045
(1.669)∗∗∗ (1.193)∗∗∗ (1.064)∗∗∗
News-2 -8.222 -5.854
(1.259)∗∗∗ (0.909)∗∗∗
News-3 -6.760
(1.024)∗∗∗
N 266 264 262 260
R2 0.071 0.102 0.121 0.137
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 26: Gender Panel: Formal Average Income
Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -14.084 -9.960 -8.984 -8.744
(2.419)∗∗∗ (1.746)∗∗∗ (1.640)∗∗∗ (1.632)∗∗∗
News-1 -9.422 -6.911 -6.165
(1.707)∗∗∗ (1.327)∗∗∗ (1.203)∗∗∗
News-2 -7.075 -4.984
(1.256)∗∗∗ (0.86)∗∗∗
News-3 -6.290
(1.304)∗∗∗
N 266 264 262 260
R2 0.033 0.047 0.057 0.067
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Adding Growth Dummies
Table 27: Education Panel: Employment with growth heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -10.317 -7.778 -8.336 -8.359
(4.824)∗∗ (3.676)∗∗ (3.715)∗∗ (3.609)∗∗
News-1 -5.047 -9.277 -10.070 -10.082
(2.141)∗∗ (4.032)∗∗ (4.204)∗∗ (4.177)∗∗
News-2 -4.133 -4.075 -2.402 -2.425
(1.952)∗∗ (1.930)∗∗ (2.063) (1.800)
News-3 -4.456 -4.870 -4.693 -4.616
(1.828)∗∗ (2.013)∗∗ (1.989)∗∗ (2.605)∗
News-Growth 10.148 5.817 6.686 6.712
(4.360)∗∗ (2.434)∗∗ (2.560)∗∗∗ (2.529)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 6.795 8.128 8.152
(3.168)∗∗ (3.326)∗∗ (3.271)∗∗
News-Growth-2 -2.893 -2.841
(2.630) (2.053)
News-Growth-3 -.132
(1.816)
N 484 484 484 484
R2 0.103 0.107 0.108 0.108
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 28: Education Panel: Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -9.403 -5.005 -8.121 -7.367
(1.392)∗∗∗ (1.786)∗∗∗ (1.633)∗∗∗ (2.529)∗∗∗
News-1 -8.469 -15.968 -20.137 -19.681
(1.532)∗∗∗ (2.390)∗∗∗ (2.724)∗∗∗ (2.219)∗∗∗
News-2 -7.628 -7.633 1.220 1.772
(0.998)∗∗∗ (0.999)∗∗∗ (0.336)∗∗∗ (0.362)∗∗∗
News-3 -12.181 -12.761 -11.777 -13.998
(3.190)∗∗∗ (3.260)∗∗∗ (3.192)∗∗∗ (5.880)∗∗
News-Growth 2.352 -5.351 -.923 -1.826
(1.102)∗∗ (1.835)∗∗∗ (1.580) (2.670)
News-Growth-1 12.228 18.633 17.862
(1.436)∗∗∗ (1.965)∗∗∗ (1.244)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -14.188 -15.490
(1.205)∗∗∗ (2.628)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 3.723
(4.552)
N 444 444 444 444
R2 0.16 0.166 0.174 0.174
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 29: Education Panel: Formal Employment with growth heterogeneous effects
Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -7.283 -5.524 -6.668 -6.793
(2.715)∗∗∗ (2.028)∗∗∗ (2.396)∗∗∗ (2.387)∗∗∗
News-1 -4.623 -7.648 -9.439 -9.524
(1.638)∗∗∗ (2.836)∗∗∗ (3.396)∗∗∗ (3.380)∗∗∗
News-2 -3.604 -3.582 0.06 -.072
(1.395)∗∗∗ (1.388)∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.251)
News-3 -4.141 -4.358 -3.993 -3.552
(1.592)∗∗∗ (1.680)∗∗∗ (1.569)∗∗ (1.755)∗∗
News-Growth 3.595 0.541 2.278 2.428
(1.483)∗∗ (0.414) (0.877)∗∗∗ (0.925)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 4.835 7.679 7.822
(1.994)∗∗ (2.839)∗∗∗ (2.792)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -6.054 -5.773
(1.949)∗∗∗ (1.984)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 -.734
(0.82)
N 464 464 464 464
R2 0.153 0.157 0.163 0.163
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
47
Table 30: Education Panel: Formal Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -18.883 -12.499 -14.372 -14.142
(5.859)∗∗∗ (3.997)∗∗∗ (3.879)∗∗∗ (3.416)∗∗∗
News-1 -8.269 -19.244 -22.178 -22.023
(1.969)∗∗∗ (5.048)∗∗∗ (4.805)∗∗∗ (4.495)∗∗∗
News-2 -6.711 -6.632 -.667 -.424
(1.240)∗∗∗ (1.220)∗∗∗ (1.891) (1.497)
News-3 -8.185 -8.972 -8.374 -9.183
(1.597)∗∗∗ (1.837)∗∗∗ (1.897)∗∗∗ (3.529)∗∗∗
News-Growth 15.747 4.666 7.510 7.233
(6.652)∗∗ (3.317) (3.125)∗∗ (2.593)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 17.540 22.198 21.934
(5.390)∗∗∗ (4.941)∗∗∗ (4.445)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -9.914 -10.431
(1.328)∗∗∗ (1.147)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 1.348
(2.770)
N 464 464 464 464
R2 0.12 0.131 0.134 0.134
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 31: Age Panel: Employment with growth heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -12.221 -9.104 -10.071 -10.084
(4.030)∗∗∗ (2.893)∗∗∗ (3.283)∗∗∗ (3.397)∗∗∗
News-1 -4.826 -10.064 -11.567 -11.574
(2.065)∗∗ (3.984)∗∗ (4.589)∗∗ (4.652)∗∗
News-2 -3.375 -3.295 -.160 -.175
(1.411)∗∗ (1.384)∗∗ (0.387) (0.599)
News-3 -3.325 -3.829 -3.517 -3.469
(1.720)∗ (1.894)∗∗ (1.780)∗∗ (1.283)∗∗∗
News-Growth 12.344 7.032 8.585 8.601
(4.083)∗∗∗ (2.143)∗∗∗ (2.764)∗∗∗ (2.892)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 8.397 10.942 10.958
(3.077)∗∗∗ (4.096)∗∗∗ (4.223)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -5.469 -5.435
(2.182)∗∗ (1.954)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 -.084
(1.182)
N 390 390 390 390
R2 0.069 0.074 0.076 0.076
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 32: Age Panel: Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -9.778 -4.100 -7.434 -7.138
(1.854)∗∗∗ (2.331)∗ (1.933)∗∗∗ (2.008)∗∗∗
News-1 -8.227 -17.910 -22.370 -22.191
(0.769)∗∗∗ (1.535)∗∗∗ (2.473)∗∗∗ (2.467)∗∗∗
News-2 -9.162 -9.168 0.305 0.522
(1.015)∗∗∗ (1.018)∗∗∗ (0.996) (1.015)
News-3 -11.114 -11.863 -10.809 -11.682
(1.886)∗∗∗ (1.955)∗∗∗ (1.747)∗∗∗ (1.761)∗∗∗
News-Growth 3.432 -6.515 -1.777 -2.131
(1.695)∗∗ (2.678)∗∗ (1.902) (1.986)
News-Growth-1 15.788 22.642 22.339
(1.675)∗∗∗ (3.109)∗∗∗ (3.079)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -15.182 -15.693
(3.226)∗∗∗ (3.276)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 1.462
(0.357)∗∗∗
N 333 333 333 333
R2 0.15 0.16 0.168 0.168
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 33: Age Panel: Formal Employment with growth heterogeneous effects
Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -8.746 -6.614 -7.679 -7.612
(3.046)∗∗∗ (2.306)∗∗∗ (2.747)∗∗∗ (2.627)∗∗∗
News-1 -5.051 -8.633 -10.290 -10.255
(1.795)∗∗∗ (3.029)∗∗∗ (3.712)∗∗∗ (3.655)∗∗∗
News-2 -3.926 -3.871 -.417 -.337
(1.624)∗∗ (1.608)∗∗ (0.313) (0.322)
News-3 -4.575 -4.919 -4.576 -4.822
(1.773)∗∗∗ (1.896)∗∗∗ (1.757)∗∗∗ (2.218)∗∗
News-Growth 5.162 1.528 3.240 3.160
(2.135)∗∗ (0.87)∗ (1.576)∗∗ (1.429)∗∗
News-Growth-1 5.744 8.548 8.472
(2.005)∗∗∗ (3.163)∗∗∗ (3.026)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -6.026 -6.197
(2.482)∗∗ (2.806)∗∗
News-Growth-3 0.424
(0.842)
N 390 390 390 390
R2 0.11 0.113 0.117 0.117
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 34: Age Panel: Formal Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -19.749 -13.039 -14.586 -14.211
(4.487)∗∗∗ (3.459)∗∗∗ (3.517)∗∗∗ (3.399)∗∗∗
News-1 -7.698 -18.970 -21.375 -21.181
(0.844)∗∗∗ (2.366)∗∗∗ (2.570)∗∗∗ (2.562)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.592 -5.419 -.403 0.038
(0.471)∗∗∗ (0.448)∗∗∗ (0.804) (0.495)
News-3 -7.135 -8.218 -7.720 -9.085
(1.503)∗∗∗ (1.689)∗∗∗ (1.657)∗∗∗ (2.177)∗∗∗
News-Growth 17.566 6.133 8.618 8.174
(4.588)∗∗∗ (3.204)∗ (3.159)∗∗∗ (2.929)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 18.072 22.143 21.721
(3.381)∗∗∗ (3.875)∗∗∗ (3.961)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -8.748 -9.699
(1.289)∗∗∗ (0.93)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 2.357
(1.710)
N 390 390 390 390
R2 0.082 0.091 0.094 0.094
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 35: Gender Panel: Employment with growth heterogeneous effects
Overall Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -18.334 -13.658 -15.108 -15.128
(2.738)∗∗∗ (2.505)∗∗∗ (2.433)∗∗∗ (2.245)∗∗∗
News-1 -7.236 -15.092 -17.347 -17.358
(0.292)∗∗∗ (0.694)∗∗∗ (0.576)∗∗∗ (0.478)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.063 -4.943 -.241 -.265
(0.297)∗∗∗ (0.303)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.284)
News-3 -4.989 -5.744 -5.277 -5.203
(0.667)∗∗∗ (0.63)∗∗∗ (0.606)∗∗∗ (0.096)∗∗∗
News-Growth 18.515 10.546 12.875 12.899
(2.369)∗∗∗ (1.966)∗∗∗ (1.848)∗∗∗ (1.622)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 12.597 16.414 16.437
(0.644)∗∗∗ (0.444)∗∗∗ (0.227)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -8.202 -8.151
(0.432)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 -.128
(1.215)
N 260 260 260 260
R2 0.086 0.092 0.094 0.094
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 36: Gender Panel: Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -10.820 -5.062 -8.516 -8.206
(0.923)∗∗∗ (0.058)∗∗∗ (0.807)∗∗∗ (0.381)∗∗∗
News-1 -8.858 -18.677 -23.297 -23.110
(1.553)∗∗∗ (3.234)∗∗∗ (4.399)∗∗∗ (4.150)∗∗∗
News-2 -9.212 -9.219 0.593 0.819
(1.496)∗∗∗ (1.501)∗∗∗ (0.954) (1.269)
News-3 -12.185 -12.945 -11.854 -12.766
(2.616)∗∗∗ (2.752)∗∗∗ (2.485)∗∗∗ (3.751)∗∗∗
News-Growth 4.272 -5.815 -.908 -1.278
(0.178)∗∗∗ (1.902)∗∗∗ (0.676) (1.190)
News-Growth-1 16.011 23.109 22.793
(2.735)∗∗∗ (4.520)∗∗∗ (4.094)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -15.723 -16.257
(3.940)∗∗∗ (4.688)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 1.529
(2.112)
N 222 222 222 222
R2 0.161 0.171 0.179 0.179
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 37: Gender Panel: Formal Employment with growth heterogeneous effects
Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -13.119 -9.907 -11.506 -11.399
(2.663)∗∗∗ (1.646)∗∗∗ (1.485)∗∗∗ (1.198)∗∗∗
News-1 -7.619 -13.014 -15.500 -15.444
(1.265)∗∗∗ (2.985)∗∗∗ (2.735)∗∗∗ (2.591)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.956 -5.874 -.691 -.566
(0.946)∗∗∗ (0.922)∗∗∗ (1.457) (1.119)
News-3 -6.915 -7.434 -6.919 -7.307
(1.080)∗∗∗ (1.247)∗∗∗ (1.302)∗∗∗ (2.359)∗∗∗
News-Growth 7.704 2.231 4.798 4.672
(2.666)∗∗∗ (0.929)∗∗ (0.666)∗∗∗ (0.325)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 8.651 12.857 12.737
(2.754)∗∗∗ (2.327)∗∗∗ (2.005)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -9.039 -9.310
(0.93)∗∗∗ (0.198)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 0.67
(1.820)
N 260 260 260 260
R2 0.144 0.148 0.153 0.153
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 38: Gender Panel: Formal Average Income with growth heterogeneous effects
Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -18.793 -12.831 -14.185 -13.707
(2.026)∗∗∗ (2.476)∗∗∗ (3.063)∗∗∗ (3.367)∗∗∗
News-1 -7.485 -17.500 -19.605 -19.358
(1.257)∗∗∗ (0.51)∗∗∗ (1.417)∗∗∗ (1.573)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.219 -5.065 -.677 -.115
(0.871)∗∗∗ (0.884)∗∗∗ (1.002) (0.654)
News-3 -6.646 -7.609 -7.173 -8.910
(1.320)∗∗∗ (1.251)∗∗∗ (1.066)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
News-Growth 17.712 7.553 9.727 9.162
(0.69)∗∗∗ (1.451)∗∗∗ (2.389)∗∗∗ (2.746)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 16.058 19.620 19.082
(1.201)∗∗∗ (0.329)∗∗∗ (0.665)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -7.655 -8.864
(3.293)∗∗ (2.546)∗∗∗
News-Growth-3 2.999
(1.869)
N 260 260 260 260
R2 0.086 0.094 0.096 0.097
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Some Control Variables
Table 39: Education Panel: Employment and Average Income with controls
Employment Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -1.905 -1.271 -.615 -2.492 -.791 0.223
(2.001) (1.819) (1.732) (1.339)∗ (1.521) (1.564)
News-1 -2.553 -.952 -.444 -5.219 -2.439 -2.009
(1.066)∗∗ (0.319)∗∗∗ (0.135)∗∗∗ (1.216)∗∗∗ (0.917)∗∗∗ (0.914)∗∗
News-2 -3.979 -.946 -.280 -7.906 -2.125 -1.381
(1.892)∗∗ (0.478)∗∗ (0.324) (1.045)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.364)∗∗∗
News-3 -4.158 -.700 0.006 -12.240 -5.242 -4.268
(1.707)∗∗ (0.199)∗∗∗ (0.306) (3.190)∗∗∗ (2.423)∗∗ (2.388)∗
GDP 3.199 0.654 0.194 6.381 1.594 1.062
(1.489)∗∗ (0.503) (0.4) (0.836)∗∗∗ (0.307)∗∗∗ (0.272)∗∗∗
Univ 3.379 1.270 6.821 4.657
(1.588)∗∗ (0.82) (0.769)∗∗∗ (0.728)∗∗∗
Popul 44.553 50.274
(26.670)∗ (10.059)∗∗∗
N 484 484 484 444 444 444
R2 0.271 0.499 0.529 0.474 0.848 0.859
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 40: Education Panel: Formal Employment and Average Income with controls
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -2.972 -2.018 -1.608 -3.812 -1.602 0.293
(1.120)∗∗∗ (0.775)∗∗∗ (0.64)∗∗ (0.846)∗∗∗ (0.599)∗∗∗ (0.781)
News-1 -2.972 -1.560 -1.313 -3.391 -.120 1.026
(1.043)∗∗∗ (0.539)∗∗∗ (0.435)∗∗∗ (1.037)∗∗∗ (1.003) (1.220)
News-2 -3.625 -1.175 -.903 -6.668 -.992 0.265
(1.400)∗∗∗ (0.515)∗∗ (0.395)∗∗ (1.189)∗∗∗ (0.641) (0.801)
News-3 -4.112 -1.303 -1.028 -8.042 -1.535 -.263
(1.580)∗∗∗ (0.597)∗∗ (0.469)∗∗ (1.533)∗∗∗ (0.482)∗∗∗ (0.395)
GDP 2.584 0.437 0.23 6.841 1.868 0.912
(0.911)∗∗∗ (0.222)∗∗ (0.158) (1.577)∗∗∗ (0.657)∗∗∗ (0.348)∗∗∗
Univ 2.966 2.077 6.871 2.757
(1.086)∗∗∗ (0.765)∗∗∗ (1.277)∗∗∗ (0.34)∗∗∗
Popul 19.621 90.725
(9.204)∗∗ (32.413)∗∗∗
N 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.363 0.662 0.671 0.418 0.756 0.796
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 41: Education Panel: Employment and Average Income with controls and growth heteroge-
neous effects
Employment Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -4.038 -3.690 -1.233 1.423 0.149 3.091
(1.878)∗∗ (1.736)∗∗ (1.292) (3.595) (3.466) (3.649)
News-1 -7.336 -2.726 -1.125 -13.122 -2.295 1.087
(2.906)∗∗ (0.912)∗∗∗ (0.315)∗∗∗ (1.377)∗∗∗ (0.37)∗∗∗ (0.561)∗
News-2 -2.291 -1.516 -.075 0.413 -.734 0.724
(1.765) (1.510) (1.193) (0.188)∗∗ (0.094)∗∗∗ (0.283)∗∗
News-3 -4.141 -.796 0.433 -13.513 -6.490 -4.284
(2.453)∗ (1.519) (1.407) (5.825)∗∗ (5.070) (4.962)
News-Growth 3.448 4.064 0.922 -7.007 -1.368 -3.824
(1.246)∗∗∗ (1.395)∗∗∗ (1.081) (3.310)∗∗ (2.730) (2.861)
News-Growth-1 6.923 2.029 0.985 13.181 -.094 -3.911
(2.697)∗∗ (0.776)∗∗∗ (0.584)∗ (0.789)∗∗∗ (1.259) (1.477)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -2.885 0.953 -.336 -13.570 -2.482 -3.043
(2.068) (1.991) (1.779) (2.377)∗∗∗ (1.135)∗∗ (1.185)∗∗
News-Growth-3 -.460 -.361 -.797 2.894 2.270 1.082
(1.820) (1.829) (1.774) (4.454) (4.393) (4.353)
GDP 3.103 0.573 0.198 6.394 1.623 1.020
(1.466)∗∗ (0.498) (0.403) (0.854)∗∗∗ (0.327)∗∗∗ (0.272)∗∗∗
Univ 3.370 1.323 6.803 3.992
(1.596)∗∗ (0.732)∗ (0.767)∗∗∗ (0.666)∗∗∗
Popul 43.307 65.130
(27.554) (12.490)∗∗∗
N 484 484 484 444 444 444
R2 0.281 0.506 0.529 0.485 0.848 0.863
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 42: Education Panel: Formal Employment and Average Income with controls and growth
heterogeneous effects
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -3.063 -2.410 -1.024 -4.395 -2.877 2.857
(1.086)∗∗∗ (0.852)∗∗∗ (0.498)∗∗ (1.242)∗∗∗ (0.972)∗∗∗ (1.095)∗∗∗
News-1 -6.996 -2.294 -1.259 -15.417 -4.498 -.217
(2.502)∗∗∗ (0.802)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (3.044)∗∗∗ (1.170)∗∗∗ (0.908)
News-2 -.425 -.894 -.366 -1.347 -2.436 -.248
(0.362) (0.522)∗ (0.303) (1.637) (1.794) (1.298)
News-3 -3.472 -1.158 -.720 -8.974 -3.599 -1.786
(1.732)∗∗ (0.983) (0.842) (3.488)∗∗ (2.511) (1.992)
News-Growth -.176 0.593 -.943 0.429 2.216 -4.143
(0.428) (0.411) (0.622) (1.097) (1.422) (0.729)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 6.359 1.048 0.167 18.112 5.777 2.130
(2.294)∗∗∗ (0.463)∗∗ (0.338) (3.644)∗∗∗ (1.654)∗∗∗ (1.052)∗∗
News-Growth-2 -5.234 -.470 -.787 -9.024 2.041 0.73
(1.801)∗∗∗ (0.065)∗∗∗ (0.179)∗∗∗ (1.083)∗∗∗ (2.350) (1.970)
News-Growth-3 -.785 -.264 -.328 1.213 2.424 2.160
(0.819) (0.877) (0.872) (2.743) (2.970) (2.895)
GDP 2.564 0.429 0.23 6.701 1.742 0.919
(0.905)∗∗∗ (0.22)∗ (0.156) (1.514)∗∗∗ (0.58)∗∗∗ (0.347)∗∗∗
Univ 2.959 1.960 6.872 2.737
(1.091)∗∗∗ (0.751)∗∗∗ (1.303)∗∗∗ (0.228)∗∗∗
Popul 22.008 91.072
(10.063)∗∗ (28.474)∗∗∗
N 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.37 0.662 0.672 0.432 0.763 0.796
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 43: Age Panel: Employment and Average Income with controls
Employment Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -1.559 -1.071 -.725 -1.717 0.062 1.225
(0.552)∗∗∗ (0.399)∗∗∗ (0.402)∗ (1.253) (1.440) (1.619)
News-1 -1.838 -.463 -.450 -4.621 -1.713 -1.221
(1.097)∗ (0.634) (0.67) (0.419)∗∗∗ (0.404)∗∗∗ (0.524)∗∗
News-2 -3.706 -.357 -.262 -9.455 -3.409 -2.555
(1.511)∗∗ (0.479) (0.467) (1.076)∗∗∗ (0.337)∗∗∗ (0.211)∗∗∗
News-3 -3.627 0.161 0.159 -11.183 -3.865 -2.748
(1.806)∗∗ (0.729) (0.692) (1.888)∗∗∗ (0.847)∗∗∗ (0.731)∗∗∗
GDP 4.873 0.844 0.31 6.946 1.940 1.329
(1.609)∗∗∗ (0.248)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.993)∗∗∗ (0.272)∗∗∗ (0.166)∗∗∗
Univ 4.865 2.043 7.134 4.649
(1.702)∗∗∗ (1.172)∗ (1.032)∗∗∗ (0.511)∗∗∗
Popul 161.316 173.103
(83.903)∗ (24.113)∗∗∗
N 390 390 390 333 333 333
R2 0.354 0.708 0.812 0.501 0.887 0.932
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 44: Age Panel: Formal Employment and Average Income with controls
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -2.929 -2.535 -2.471 -3.138 -2.374 -1.895
(0.655)∗∗∗ (0.501)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.784)∗∗∗ (0.665)∗∗∗ (0.325)∗∗∗
News-1 -3.034 -1.923 -1.921 -2.634 -.481 -.464
(1.010)∗∗∗ (0.614)∗∗∗ (0.626)∗∗∗ (0.872)∗∗∗ (1.117) (1.285)
News-2 -4.248 -1.544 -1.527 -6.257 -1.018 -.886
(1.754)∗∗ (0.695)∗∗ (0.702)∗∗ (0.562)∗∗∗ (0.304)∗∗∗ (0.506)∗
News-3 -4.905 -1.847 -1.847 -7.779 -1.854 -1.857
(1.908)∗∗ (0.705)∗∗∗ (0.74)∗∗ (1.588)∗∗∗ (0.63)∗∗∗ (0.529)∗∗∗
GDP 3.847 0.594 0.495 8.850 2.547 1.804
(1.582)∗∗ (0.339)∗ (0.175)∗∗∗ (1.562)∗∗∗ (0.557)∗∗∗ (0.215)∗∗∗
Univ 3.928 3.403 7.611 3.690
(1.553)∗∗ (1.460)∗∗ (1.237)∗∗∗ (0.937)∗∗∗
Popul 29.981 224.126
(81.415) (52.717)∗∗∗
N 390 390 390 390 390 390
R2 0.382 0.717 0.722 0.473 0.822 0.904
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 45: Age Panel: Employment and Average Income with controls and growth heterogeneous
effects
Employment Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -3.821 -3.833 -1.487 2.408 1.078 3.848
(1.388)∗∗∗ (1.393)∗∗∗ (1.366) (2.739) (2.621) (3.062)
News-1 -7.884 -2.225 -1.280 -15.069 -3.773 -.588
(3.451)∗∗ (1.491) (1.386) (1.428)∗∗∗ (0.285)∗∗∗ (0.976)
News-2 -.761 -1.179 -.109 -.954 -2.151 -.778
(0.674) (0.77) (0.966) (0.805) (0.644)∗∗∗ (0.848)
News-3 -3.439 0.007 0.644 -11.155 -3.828 -1.751
(1.275)∗∗∗ (0.099) (0.187)∗∗∗ (1.687)∗∗∗ (0.632)∗∗∗ (0.256)∗∗∗
News-Growth 3.792 4.805 1.227 -7.758 -1.874 -4.187
(1.331)∗∗∗ (1.683)∗∗∗ (1.666) (2.510)∗∗∗ (2.031) (2.264)∗
News-Growth-1 9.050 1.953 1.208 17.255 3.405 -.189
(3.603)∗∗ (1.132)∗ (1.021) (2.382)∗∗∗ (1.070)∗∗∗ (1.265)
News-Growth-2 -5.106 1.365 -.221 -13.608 -2.039 -2.568
(1.848)∗∗∗ (0.582)∗∗ (1.042) (2.984)∗∗∗ (1.488) (1.461)∗
News-Growth-3 -.658 -.320 -.912 0.562 -.089 -1.208
(1.284) (1.211) (1.128) (0.36) (0.396) (0.611)∗∗
GDP 4.778 0.749 0.3 6.943 1.965 1.398
(1.585)∗∗∗ (0.227)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (1.017)∗∗∗ (0.306)∗∗∗ (0.177)∗∗∗
Univ 4.869 2.063 7.098 4.452
(1.710)∗∗∗ (1.228)∗ (1.024)∗∗∗ (0.353)∗∗∗
Popul 159.883 183.958
(86.437)∗ (17.376)∗∗∗
N 390 390 390 333 333 333
R2 0.364 0.714 0.813 0.514 0.888 0.935
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 46: Age Panel: Formal Employment and Average Income with controls and growth hetero-
geneous effects
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -2.586 -2.595 -2.148 -2.763 -2.780 0.498
(0.577)∗∗∗ (0.581)∗∗∗ (1.129)∗ (1.495)∗ (1.500)∗ (0.652)
News-1 -7.294 -2.736 -2.556 -14.436 -5.605 -4.284
(2.454)∗∗∗ (0.678)∗∗∗ (0.765)∗∗∗ (1.413)∗∗∗ (0.63)∗∗∗ (1.117)∗∗∗
News-2 -.808 -1.144 -.940 -1.033 -1.684 -.189
(0.379)∗∗ (0.474)∗∗ (0.777) (0.515)∗∗ (0.568)∗∗∗ (0.715)
News-3 -4.798 -2.022 -1.901 -9.031 -3.653 -2.763
(2.211)∗∗ (1.127)∗ (0.974)∗ (2.171)∗∗∗ (1.405)∗∗∗ (1.247)∗∗
News-Growth -.699 0.116 -.565 -.617 0.964 -4.038
(0.189)∗∗∗ (0.2) (1.796) (1.808) (1.986) (1.563)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 6.941 1.226 1.084 18.233 7.161 6.119
(2.397)∗∗∗ (0.185)∗∗∗ (0.149)∗∗∗ (3.452)∗∗∗ (2.463)∗∗∗ (2.135)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -5.932 -.721 -1.023 -9.097 0.999 -1.217
(2.701)∗∗ (0.693) (1.435) (0.839)∗∗∗ (1.129) (0.524)∗∗
News-Growth-3 -.037 0.235 0.123 1.308 1.835 1.008
(0.665) (0.762) (0.545) (1.680) (1.706) (1.614)
GDP 3.834 0.589 0.504 8.734 2.447 1.819
(1.585)∗∗ (0.34)∗ (0.185)∗∗∗ (1.532)∗∗∗ (0.528)∗∗∗ (0.235)∗∗∗
Univ 3.921 3.386 7.597 3.674
(1.559)∗∗ (1.487)∗∗ (1.248)∗∗∗ (0.954)∗∗∗
Popul 30.470 223.514
(84.858) (54.150)∗∗∗
N 390 390 390 390 390 390
R2 0.387 0.717 0.722 0.483 0.827 0.905
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 47: Gender Panel: Employment and Average Income with controls
Employment Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -2.342 -1.609 -1.117 -2.079 -.235 1.086
(0.956)∗∗ (0.941)∗ (0.801) (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.357) (0.43)∗∗
News-1 -2.754 -.690 -.769 -5.096 -2.082 -1.569
(0.133)∗∗∗ (0.181)∗∗∗ (0.277)∗∗∗ (1.005)∗∗∗ (0.369)∗∗∗ (0.293)∗∗∗
News-2 -5.560 -.536 -.497 -9.505 -3.238 -2.313
(0.269)∗∗∗ (0.387) (0.519) (1.554)∗∗∗ (0.231)∗∗∗ (0.132)∗∗∗
News-3 -5.441 0.241 0.047 -12.261 -4.675 -3.476
(0.649)∗∗∗ (0.783) (0.964) (2.623)∗∗∗ (1.023)∗∗∗ (0.885)∗∗∗
GDP 7.310 1.266 0.364 7.135 1.946 1.237
(0.584)∗∗∗ (0.444)∗∗∗ (0.355) (1.169)∗∗∗ (0.072)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗
Univ 7.298 2.448 7.395 4.478
(0.171)∗∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗ (1.566)∗∗∗ (1.515)∗∗∗
Popul 189.848 139.797
(11.865)∗∗∗ (0.277)∗∗∗
N 260 260 260 222 222 222
R2 0.442 0.882 0.947 0.513 0.907 0.925
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 48: Gender Panel: Formal Employment and Average Income with controls
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -4.424 -3.833 -3.701 -2.470 -1.728 -1.322
(0.444)∗∗∗ (0.373)∗∗∗ (0.285)∗∗∗ (0.788)∗∗∗ (0.689)∗∗ (0.564)∗∗
News-1 -4.601 -2.935 -2.956 -2.619 -.527 -.592
(0.667)∗∗∗ (0.465)∗∗∗ (0.448)∗∗∗ (0.727)∗∗∗ (0.444) (0.367)
News-2 -6.439 -2.386 -2.375 -5.832 -.741 -.709
(1.006)∗∗∗ (0.514)∗∗∗ (0.476)∗∗∗ (0.976)∗∗∗ (0.286)∗∗∗ (0.178)∗∗∗
News-3 -7.410 -2.826 -2.877 -7.232 -1.474 -1.634
(1.132)∗∗∗ (0.575)∗∗∗ (0.548)∗∗∗ (1.434)∗∗∗ (0.653)∗∗ (0.511)∗∗∗
GDP 5.760 0.883 0.643 8.357 2.231 1.489
(0.941)∗∗∗ (0.348)∗∗ (0.231)∗∗∗ (1.128)∗∗∗ (0.297)∗∗∗ (0.207)∗∗∗
Univ 5.889 4.595 7.397 3.401
(0.719)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗ (1.006)∗∗∗ (0.601)∗∗∗
Popul 50.624 156.376
(22.853)∗∗ (13.384)∗∗∗
N 260 260 260 260 260 260
R2 0.494 0.927 0.934 0.494 0.882 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 49: Gender Panel: Employment and Average Income with controls and growth heteroge-
neous effects
Employment Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -5.734 -5.751 -1.721 1.589 0.209 3.967
(1.508)∗∗∗ (1.511)∗∗∗ (1.234) (1.247) (0.957) (1.053)∗∗∗
News-1 -11.823 -3.333 -1.804 -15.803 -4.083 0.228
(0.042)∗∗∗ (0.164)∗∗∗ (0.366)∗∗∗ (2.945)∗∗∗ (0.457)∗∗∗ (0.342)
News-2 -1.143 -1.770 -.002 -.695 -1.937 -.157
(0.215)∗∗∗ (0.201)∗∗∗ (0.4) (1.021) (0.759)∗∗ (0.894)
News-3 -5.159 0.011 1.003 -12.226 -4.624 -1.842
(0.093)∗∗∗ (0.032) (0.208)∗∗∗ (3.670)∗∗∗ (2.060)∗∗ (1.956)
News-Growth 5.686 7.205 0.874 -7.052 -.947 -4.173
(1.056)∗∗∗ (1.095)∗∗∗ (0.846) (2.153)∗∗∗ (0.858) (0.85)∗∗∗
News-Growth-1 13.575 2.930 1.684 17.576 3.207 -1.752
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.257)∗∗∗ (0.376)∗∗∗ (3.236)∗∗∗ (0.184)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -7.657 2.050 -.754 -14.118 -2.116 -2.832
(0.019)∗∗∗ (0.217)∗∗∗ (0.1)∗∗∗ (4.343)∗∗∗ (1.798) (1.825)
News-Growth-3 -.989 -.482 -1.624 0.605 -.070 -1.741
(1.150) (1.164) (1.217) (1.963) (1.824) (1.944)
GDP 7.167 1.123 0.368 7.124 1.960 1.202
(0.565)∗∗∗ (0.42)∗∗∗ (0.35) (1.185)∗∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗∗
Univ 7.303 2.457 7.364 3.767
(0.177)∗∗∗ (0.131)∗∗∗ (1.568)∗∗∗ (1.492)∗∗
Popul 189.049 171.981
(8.994)∗∗∗ (0.242)∗∗∗
N 260 260 260 222 222 222
R2 0.454 0.89 0.947 0.525 0.908 0.93
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Table 50: Gender Panel: Formal Employment and Average Income with controls and growth
heterogeneous effects
Formal Employment Formal Average Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
News -3.874 -3.887 -2.722 -2.914 -2.931 0.363
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.472)∗∗∗ (1.864) (1.870) (1.408)
News-1 -11.011 -4.177 -3.735 -12.999 -4.404 -3.154
(1.884)∗∗∗ (1.037)∗∗∗ (0.836)∗∗∗ (0.687)∗∗∗ (0.487)∗∗∗ (0.742)∗∗∗
News-2 -1.270 -1.774 -1.263 -1.125 -1.759 -.314
(1.234) (1.299) (1.077) (0.514)∗∗ (0.428)∗∗∗ (0.695)
News-3 -7.272 -3.111 -2.824 -8.859 -3.625 -2.814
(2.358)∗∗∗ (1.845)∗ (1.703)∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.737)∗∗∗ (0.94)∗∗∗
News-Growth -1.107 0.116 -1.713 0.874 2.412 -2.762
(0.604)∗ (0.453) (1.128) (1.592) (1.805) (1.231)∗∗
News-Growth-1 10.445 1.877 1.517 15.795 5.018 3.999
(1.641)∗∗∗ (0.578)∗∗∗ (0.427)∗∗∗ (0.206)∗∗∗ (1.266)∗∗∗ (1.439)∗∗∗
News-Growth-2 -8.914 -1.102 -1.912 -8.297 1.530 -.761
(0.262)∗∗∗ (1.234) (0.936)∗∗ (2.471)∗∗∗ (1.133) (1.396)
News-Growth-3 -.020 0.388 0.058 2.010 2.523 1.590
(1.713) (1.767) (1.677) (2.011) (1.945) (1.976)
GDP 5.741 0.877 0.659 8.234 2.115 1.498
(0.923)∗∗∗ (0.32)∗∗∗ (0.228)∗∗∗ (1.152)∗∗∗ (0.318)∗∗∗ (0.217)∗∗∗
Univ 5.878 4.478 7.394 3.433
(0.731)∗∗∗ (0.183)∗∗∗ (1.011)∗∗∗ (0.476)∗∗∗
Popul 54.639 154.512
(20.570)∗∗∗ (18.454)∗∗∗
N 260 260 260 260 260 260
R2 0.501 0.927 0.934 0.504 0.888 0.921
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_Growth is the interaction between
our growth dummy and the contemporaneous value of the News variable. Similarly, News_Growth 1, 2 and 3 repre-
sents the interaction between our growth dummy and the first, second and third lag of the News variable; respectively.
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Heterogeneous demographic effects
Table 51: Education Panel: Employment - Fixed Effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News 11.159 6.994 8.156 4.740
(3.958)∗∗∗ (2.489)∗∗∗ (3.081)∗∗∗ (1.846)∗∗
News-sec -22.721 -16.099 -17.191 -11.440
(2.34e-13)∗∗∗ (2.03e-13)∗∗∗ (1.80e-13)∗∗∗ (2.39e-13)∗∗∗
News-nus -10.947 -6.641 -9.594 -6.091
(2.33e-13)∗∗∗ (2.03e-13)∗∗∗ (1.72e-13)∗∗∗ (2.27e-13)∗∗∗
News-su -13.428 -7.696 -12.271 -7.862
(2.31e-13)∗∗∗ (2.02e-13)∗∗∗ (1.72e-13)∗∗∗ (2.28e-13)∗∗∗
News-1 -.444 8.246 -1.313 5.714
(0.136)∗∗∗ (3.059)∗∗∗ (0.436)∗∗∗ (2.136)∗∗∗
News-sec-1 -13.817 -11.830
(6.89e-14)∗∗∗ (7.13e-14)∗∗∗
News-nus-1 -8.985 -7.207
(6.10e-14)∗∗∗ (6.46e-14)∗∗∗
News-su-1 -11.959 -9.069
(6.48e-14)∗∗∗ (6.24e-14)∗∗∗
News-2 -.280 -.280 -.903 -.903
(0.325) (0.326) (0.397)∗∗ (0.398)∗∗
News-3 0.006 0.006 -1.028 -1.028
(0.307) (0.308) (0.471)∗∗ (0.472)∗∗
GDP 0.194 0.194 0.23 0.23
(0.402) (0.403) (0.158) (0.159)
Univ 1.270 1.270 2.077 2.077
(0.823) (0.826) (0.767)∗∗∗ (0.77)∗∗∗
Popul 44.553 44.553 19.621 19.621
(26.754)∗ (26.839)∗ (9.234)∗∗ (9.265)∗∗
N 484 484 464 464
R2 0.562 0.573 0.706 0.719
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sec, News_nus, News_su are
the interaction between our dummy variable that indicates the employees level of education and the contemporane-
ous value of the News variable. The suffix sec, su, su indicates that the maximum level of education achieved by the
respondant is secondary, non superior university, superior university, respectively. Similarly, News_sec, News_nus,
News_su 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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Table 52: Education Panel: Average Income - Fixed Effects
Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News 4.045 1.636 7.007 4.669
(3.285) (1.864) (3.922)∗ (2.888)
News-sec -3.294 -1.578 -6.350 -3.531
(1.04e-13)∗∗∗ (3.45e-14)∗∗∗ (3.84e-13)∗∗∗ (4.85e-13)∗∗∗
News-nus -3.505 -2.140 -3.647 -2.398
(1.01e-13)∗∗∗ (3.08e-14)∗∗∗ (3.80e-13)∗∗∗ (4.78e-13)∗∗∗
News-su -8.490 -1.937 -16.858 -11.577
(1.04e-13)∗∗∗ (2.95e-14)∗∗∗ (3.72e-13)∗∗∗ (4.72e-13)∗∗∗
News-1 -2.009 2.881 1.026 5.833
(0.918)∗∗ (2.093) (1.224) (2.715)∗∗
News-sec-1 -3.484 -5.799
(3.18e-14)∗∗∗ (1.70e-13)∗∗∗
News-nus-1 -2.771 -2.569
(2.90e-14)∗∗∗ (1.71e-13)∗∗∗
News-su-1 -13.305 -10.863
(3.25e-14)∗∗∗ (1.70e-13)∗∗∗
News-2 -1.381 -1.381 0.265 0.265
(0.366)∗∗∗ (0.367)∗∗∗ (0.804) (0.807)
News-3 -4.268 -4.268 -.263 -.263
(2.396)∗ (2.404)∗ (0.397) (0.398)
GDP 1.062 1.062 0.912 0.912
(0.273)∗∗∗ (0.274)∗∗∗ (0.349)∗∗∗ (0.35)∗∗∗
Univ 4.657 4.657 2.757 2.757
(0.73)∗∗∗ (0.733)∗∗∗ (0.341)∗∗∗ (0.342)∗∗∗
Popul 50.274 50.274 90.725 90.725
(10.094)∗∗∗ (10.129)∗∗∗ (32.520)∗∗∗ (32.628)∗∗∗
N 444 444 464 464
R2 0.861 0.865 0.803 0.805
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sec, News_nus, News_su are
the interaction between our dummy variable that indicates the employees level of education and the contemporane-
ous value of the News variable. The suffix sec, su, su indicates that the maximum level of education achieved by the
respondant is secondary, non superior university, superior university, respectively. Similarly, News_sec, News_nus,
News_su 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
70
Table 53: Education Panel: Employment - Pool
Overall Employment Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -109.813 -66.318 -41.633 -26.114
(15.804)∗∗∗ (15.270)∗∗∗ (5.728)∗∗∗ (6.335)∗∗∗
News-sec 333.620 198.057 75.644 45.947
(26.601)∗∗∗ (30.469)∗∗∗ (6.465)∗∗∗ (7.977)∗∗∗
News-nus 40.860 25.309 33.084 20.491
(13.913)∗∗∗ (16.525) (4.995)∗∗∗ (6.207)∗∗∗
News-su 63.271 39.448 51.372 31.588
(12.724)∗∗∗ (15.198)∗∗∗ (5.104)∗∗∗ (6.339)∗∗∗
News-1 -.362 -65.236 -1.313 -24.369
(8.786) (14.770)∗∗∗ (2.106) (5.996)∗∗∗
News-sec-1 200.834 44.123
(29.941)∗∗∗ (7.640)∗∗∗
News-nus-1 23.038 18.710
(15.971) (5.944)∗∗∗
News-su-1 35.294 29.394
(14.658)∗∗ (6.101)∗∗∗
News-2 -.258 -.280 -.903 -.903
(11.259) (8.550) (2.876) (2.255)
News-3 0.006 0.006 -1.028 -1.028
(10.124) (8.501) (2.508) (2.313)
GDP 0.22 0.194 0.23 0.23
(2.372) (2.407) (0.638) (0.643)
Univ 1.270 2.077 2.077
(3.315) (0.975)∗∗ (0.941)∗∗
Popul 64.784 44.553 19.621 19.621
(30.607)∗∗ (55.139) (15.564) (14.929)
N 484 484 464 464
R2 0.353 0.421 0.365 0.407
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sec, News_nus, News_su are
the interaction between our dummy variable that indicates the employees level of education and the contemporane-
ous value of the News variable. The suffix sec, su, su indicates that the maximum level of education achieved by the
respondant is secondary, non superior university, superior university, respectively. Similarly, News_sec, News_nus,
News_su 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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Table 54: Education Panel: Average Income - Pool
Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -92.501 -57.915 -91.330 -55.247
(13.391)∗∗∗ (12.695)∗∗∗ (12.602)∗∗∗ (12.396)∗∗∗
News-sec 28.450 18.205 38.733 24.344
(12.291)∗∗ (14.220) (11.335)∗∗∗ (13.206)∗
News-nus 78.602 48.356 93.396 56.484
(10.306)∗∗∗ (12.011)∗∗∗ (10.135)∗∗∗ (11.887)∗∗∗
News-su 263.841 165.989 234.363 141.331
(21.126)∗∗∗ (24.905)∗∗∗ (17.961)∗∗∗ (21.026)∗∗∗
News-1 -2.009 -53.716 1.026 -52.585
(7.181) (12.331)∗∗∗ (5.887) (12.326)∗∗∗
News-sec-1 15.317 21.379
(13.768) (13.067)
News-nus-1 45.219 54.841
(11.619)∗∗∗ (11.766)∗∗∗
News-su-1 146.289 138.222
(25.507)∗∗∗ (20.777)∗∗∗
News-2 -1.381 -1.381 0.265 0.265
(9.084) (6.930) (8.070) (6.083)
News-3 -4.268 -4.268 -.263 -.263
(8.277) (6.994) (7.226) (6.279)
GDP 1.062 1.062 0.912 0.912
(1.705) (1.723) (1.444) (1.451)
Univ 4.657 4.657 2.757 2.757
(3.069) (2.939) (2.565) (2.442)
Popul 50.274 50.274 90.725 90.725
(57.603) (54.532) (42.594)∗∗ (40.014)∗∗
N 444 444 464 464
R2 0.392 0.445 0.4 0.456
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_sec, News_nus, News_su are
the interaction between our dummy variable that indicates the employees level of education and the contemporane-
ous value of the News variable. The suffix sec, su, su indicates that the maximum level of education achieved by the
respondant is secondary, non superior university, superior university, respectively. Similarly, News_sec, News_nus,
News_su 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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Table 55: Age Panel: Employment - Fixed Effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News 2.556 1.092 0.767 -.633
(2.235) (1.179) (2.872) (1.603)
News-adul -9.164 -5.479 -10.783 -6.634
(1.659)∗∗∗ (1.129)∗∗∗ (1.587)∗∗∗ (1.074)∗∗∗
News-old -.683 0.02 1.074 1.124
(3.305) (2.199) (3.162) (2.092)
News-1 -.450 2.540 -1.921 0.924
(0.672) (1.478)∗ (0.627)∗∗∗ (1.962)
News-adul-1 -7.510 -8.436
(1.076)∗∗∗ (1.024)∗∗∗
News-old-1 -1.461 -.098
(2.246) (2.138)
News-2 -.262 -.263 -1.526 -1.526
(0.468) (0.468) (0.704)∗∗ (0.706)∗∗
News-3 0.159 0.159 -1.847 -1.847
(0.694) (0.696) (0.743)∗∗ (0.745)∗∗
GDP 0.311 0.312 0.493 0.493
(0.061)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗ (0.173)∗∗∗ (0.171)∗∗∗
Univ 2.050 2.057 3.393 3.392
(1.145)∗ (1.135)∗ (1.426)∗∗ (1.414)∗∗
Popul 160.905 160.513 30.590 30.632
(83.542)∗ (83.504)∗ (79.935) (79.462)
N 390 390 390 390
R2 0.818 0.821 0.737 0.743
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_adul, News_old, are the interaction
between our dummy variable that indicates the age group which the respondent belongs to and the contemporaneous
value of the News variable. The suffix adul and old, indicates that the respondent’s age lies between 25-45 and 45-65
years old; respectively. Similarly, News_adul and News_old 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of
the News variable.
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Table 56: Age Panel: Average Income - Fixed Effects
Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -.607 -.667 -2.079 -1.593
(1.062) (0.659) (1.263)∗ (0.449)∗∗∗
News-adul -.685 0.182 0.615 0.746
(0.717) (0.491) (1.070) (0.742)
News-old 6.324 5.655 -.064 -1.644
(1.284)∗∗∗ (0.861)∗∗∗ (2.133) (1.445)
News-1 -1.201 -1.111 -.464 -1.488
(0.536)∗∗ (0.752) (1.288) (0.68)∗∗
News-adul-1 -1.710 -.224
(0.454)∗∗∗ (0.707)
News-old-1 1.450 3.296
(0.849)∗ (1.476)∗∗
News-2 -2.520 -2.516 -.886 -.885
(0.196)∗∗∗ (0.194)∗∗∗ (0.508)∗ (0.511)∗
News-3 -2.702 -2.696 -1.857 -1.857
(0.734)∗∗∗ (0.736)∗∗∗ (0.531)∗∗∗ (0.532)∗∗∗
GDP 1.304 1.301 1.804 1.801
(0.16)∗∗∗ (0.159)∗∗∗ (0.212)∗∗∗ (0.209)∗∗∗
Univ 4.547 4.535 3.691 3.673
(0.505)∗∗∗ (0.506)∗∗∗ (0.956)∗∗∗ (0.977)∗∗∗
Popul 180.212 181.060 224.090 225.122
(24.442)∗∗∗ (24.351)∗∗∗ (53.912)∗∗∗ (54.873)∗∗∗
N 333 333 390 390
R2 0.933 0.934 0.904 0.904
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_adul, News_old, are the interaction
between our dummy variable that indicates the age group which the respondent belongs to and the contemporaneous
value of the News variable. The suffix adul and old, indicates that the respondent’s age lies between 25-45 and 45-65
years old; respectively. Similarly, News_adul and News_old 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of
the News variable.
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Table 57: Age Panel: Employment - Pool
Overall Employment Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -27.383 -17.085 -29.835 -19.254
(4.499)∗∗∗ (4.213)∗∗∗ (4.227)∗∗∗ (3.758)∗∗∗
News-adul 31.574 20.006 26.394 16.247
(4.840)∗∗∗ (5.097)∗∗∗ (4.515)∗∗∗ (4.646)∗∗∗
News-old 50.527 31.208 56.618 35.038
(5.333)∗∗∗ (6.831)∗∗∗ (4.733)∗∗∗ (5.616)∗∗∗
News-1 -.424 -15.696 -1.909 -17.263
(3.025) (4.620)∗∗∗ (2.516) (3.855)∗∗∗
News-adul-1 16.861 13.454
(5.304)∗∗∗ (4.712)∗∗∗
News-old-1 28.953 32.606
(7.052)∗∗∗ (5.792)∗∗∗
News-2 -.066 -.066 -1.442 -1.441
(2.703) (2.759) (2.414) (2.299)
News-3 0.154 0.154 -1.849 -1.849
(2.865) (2.531) (2.519) (2.119)
GDP -.790 -.792 0.02 0.011
(0.459)∗ (0.47)∗ (0.46) (0.465)
Univ -3.760 -3.771 0.896 0.852
(0.381)∗∗∗ (0.385)∗∗∗ (0.353)∗∗ (0.35)∗∗
Popul 493.029 493.652 173.283 175.798
(6.877)∗∗∗ (7.214)∗∗∗ (6.053)∗∗∗ (6.243)∗∗∗
N 390 390 390 390
R2 0.963 0.964 0.828 0.842
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_adul, News_old, are the interaction
between our dummy variable that indicates the age group which the respondent belongs to and the contemporaneous
value of the News variable. The suffix adul and old, indicates that the respondent’s age lies between 25-45 and 45-65
years old; respectively. Similarly, News_adul and News_old 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of
the News variable.
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Table 58: Age Panel: Average Income - Pool
Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -58.544 -36.110 -62.212 -38.038
(8.812)∗∗∗ (8.083)∗∗∗ (8.573)∗∗∗ (7.870)∗∗∗
News-adul 58.023 35.263 63.978 38.478
(8.218)∗∗∗ (8.112)∗∗∗ (8.101)∗∗∗ (8.047)∗∗∗
News-old 119.148 74.677 116.031 69.030
(9.577)∗∗∗ (11.239)∗∗∗ (8.622)∗∗∗ (10.017)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.522 -34.379 -.475 -36.002
(3.960) (7.833)∗∗∗ (3.966) (8.014)∗∗∗
News-adul-1 31.689 35.893
(7.874)∗∗∗ (8.009)∗∗∗
News-old-1 66.910 70.687
(10.566)∗∗∗ (10.001)∗∗∗
News-2 -3.078 -3.061 -.972 -.970
(5.081) (3.871) (4.962) (3.909)
News-3 -3.432 -3.409 -1.855 -1.855
(4.524) (3.923) (4.278) (3.806)
GDP 1.703 1.691 2.291 2.280
(0.872)∗ (0.879)∗ (0.913)∗∗ (0.909)∗∗
Univ 6.171 6.120 6.259 6.202
(0.811)∗∗∗ (0.769)∗∗∗ (0.741)∗∗∗ (0.709)∗∗∗
Popul 67.103 70.594 77.303 80.551
(10.228)∗∗∗ (10.434)∗∗∗ (9.152)∗∗∗ (9.393)∗∗∗
N 333 333 390 390
R2 0.559 0.599 0.573 0.612
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses, *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_adul, News_old, are the interaction
between our dummy variable that indicates the age group which the respondent belongs to and the contemporaneous
value of the News variable. The suffix adul and old, indicates that the respondent’s age lies between 25-45 and 45-65
years old; respectively. Similarly, News_adul and News_old 1, represents this same interaction using the first lag of
the News variable.
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Table 59: Gender Panel: Employment - Fixed Effects
Overall Employment Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -.443 -.175 -1.479 -2.294
(0.143)∗∗∗ (0.139) (1.924) (1.116)∗∗
News-male -1.349 -1.884 -4.448 -2.818
(0.052)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.099)∗∗∗ (0.063)∗∗∗
News-1 -.769 -1.314 -2.956 -1.297
(0.278)∗∗∗ (0.295)∗∗∗ (0.45)∗∗∗ (1.201)
News-male-1 1.089 -3.317
(0.038)∗∗∗ (0.074)∗∗∗
News-2 -.497 -.497 -2.375 -2.375
(0.52) (0.521) (0.477)∗∗∗ (0.478)∗∗∗
News-3 0.047 0.047 -2.877 -2.877
(0.966) (0.968) (0.55)∗∗∗ (0.551)∗∗∗
GDP 0.365 0.365 0.645 0.647
(0.356) (0.357) (0.232)∗∗∗ (0.232)∗∗∗
Univ 2.452 2.450 4.609 4.615
(0.211)∗∗∗ (0.211)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗
Popul 189.689 189.761 50.099 49.878
(11.897)∗∗∗ (11.922)∗∗∗ (22.917)∗∗ (22.970)∗∗
N 260 260 260 260
R2 0.947 0.947 0.935 0.936
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_male is the interaction between
our dummy variable that indicates if the respondent is a male and the contemporaneous value of the News variable.
Similarly, News_male 1 represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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Table 60: Gender Panel: Average Income - Fixed Effects
Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News 4.031 2.718 1.289 0.456
(3.444) (2.118) (2.059) (1.227)
News-male -5.916 -3.304 -5.225 -3.560
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.058)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.574 1.078 -.592 1.102
(0.294)∗∗∗ (2.416) (0.368) (1.334)
News-male-1 -5.310 -3.388
(0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗∗
News-2 -2.323 -2.328 -.709 -.709
(0.133)∗∗∗ (0.133)∗∗∗ (0.179)∗∗∗ (0.179)∗∗∗
News-3 -3.488 -3.495 -1.634 -1.633
(0.888)∗∗∗ (0.89)∗∗∗ (0.512)∗∗∗ (0.514)∗∗∗
GDP 1.245 1.248 1.492 1.493
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.208)∗∗∗ (0.208)∗∗∗
Univ 4.509 4.524 3.417 3.423
(1.519)∗∗∗ (1.522)∗∗∗ (0.603)∗∗∗ (0.604)∗∗∗
Popul 138.328 137.590 155.760 155.534
(0.227)∗∗∗ (0.202)∗∗∗ (13.426)∗∗∗ (13.458)∗∗∗
N 222 222 260 260
R2 0.927 0.928 0.921 0.922
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_male is the interaction between
our dummy variable that indicates if the respondent is a male and the contemporaneous value of the News variable.
Similarly, News_male 1 represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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Table 61: Gender Panel: Employment - Pool
Overall Employment Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -52.405 -31.748 -16.389 -11.459
(7.730)∗∗∗ (6.561)∗∗∗ (2.338)∗∗∗ (2.167)∗∗∗
News-male 102.718 61.427 25.812 15.957
(7.636)∗∗∗ (8.746)∗∗∗ (2.599)∗∗∗ (3.337)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.044 -31.888 -3.359 -10.721
(4.933) (6.620)∗∗∗ (1.825)∗ (2.214)∗∗∗
News-male-1 61.716 14.729
(8.596)∗∗∗ (3.187)∗∗∗
News-2 -1.092 -1.054 -3.197 -3.187
(5.968) (4.624) (2.242) (1.954)
News-3 -.703 -.663 -3.971 -3.962
(5.654) (4.702) (1.973)∗∗ (1.896)∗∗
GDP 0.804 0.748 1.038 1.025
(1.078) (1.095) (0.462)∗∗ (0.468)∗∗
Popul 251.140 253.274 182.267 182.776
(28.823)∗∗∗ (28.054)∗∗∗ (11.387)∗∗∗ (11.350)∗∗∗
N 260 260 260 260
R2 0.52 0.569 0.746 0.757
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_male is the interaction between
our dummy variable that indicates if the respondent is a male and the contemporaneous value of the News variable.
Similarly, News_male 1 represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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Table 62: Gender Panel: Average Income - Pool
Overall Income Formal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
News -36.094 -21.596 -44.586 -27.625
(6.071)∗∗∗ (5.036)∗∗∗ (7.005)∗∗∗ (6.135)∗∗∗
News-male 76.633 47.710 86.777 52.873
(6.565)∗∗∗ (7.968)∗∗∗ (6.743)∗∗∗ (7.974)∗∗∗
News-1 -1.522 -23.129 -.939 -26.264
(4.267) (5.190)∗∗∗ (4.446) (6.420)∗∗∗
News-male-1 43.274 50.675
(7.638)∗∗∗ (8.024)∗∗∗
News-2 -2.373 -2.313 -1.443 -1.412
(5.453) (4.319) (5.361) (4.299)
News-3 -3.460 -3.386 -2.577 -2.544
(4.999) (4.458) (4.920) (4.266)
GDP 1.349 1.301 1.965 1.919
(1.042) (1.047) (0.986)∗∗ (0.987)∗
Popul 293.549 296.008 246.746 248.498
(33.903)∗∗∗ (32.185)∗∗∗ (25.391)∗∗∗ (24.582)∗∗∗
N 222 222 260 260
R2 0.561 0.594 0.552 0.59
Note: Robust standard errors calculated by clusters at each category level for every panel are reported in parentheses,
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The variables News_male is the interaction between
our dummy variable that indicates if the respondent is a male and the contemporaneous value of the News variable.
Similarly, News_male 1 represents this same interaction using the first lag of the News variable.
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